WRAPPING IS BETTER THAN THE PRODUCT -Kanwal Sibal

Prime Minister’s visit to Washington from November 22 to 26 went as expected. It produced neither excitement nor disappointment on substantive issues. There were no surprises either by way of achieving less than what was hoped for, or more. If the visit looked for assurance that the India-US relationship would not lose steam under the Obama Administration, that assurance was forthcoming.

Disquieting signals from Obama of either poor understanding of India’s concerns on vital issues, or his conscious disregard of them, were reinforced by the joint statement issued during his November visit to China in which he endorsed China’s role in improving relations between India and Pakistan. A country unwilling to improve ties durably with India by settling the border issue on realistic terms is being touted by the US as a positive external force in helping improve our ties with Pakistan. Why should China want to do that when it has strategically used Pakistan effectively against us all these years and a rising India could cast a shadow on China’s radiance? The subsequent clarification that China does not wish to intervene in India-Pakistan differences etc is either usual Chinese double speak or the US seeks a Chinese role in India-Pakistan relations as it wants progress there for creating more favourable conditions for pursuing its wobbling Af-Pak strategy.

In any case, touching India’s raw nerve just before Prime Minister’s visit to Washington was not only ill-timed, it was also clumsy diplomacy as the joint statement implicitly rejected India’s core position that India-Pakistan problems had to be settled bilaterally, put India in a subordinate position vis a vis a China increasingly assertive in its claims over Arunachal Pradesh, and equated India and Pakistan in terms of responsibility for existing tensions. It also contradicts US’s official position that India and Pakistan have to settle their differences on their own, and that while the US favoured resumption of dialogue and reconciliation, it did not seek to intervene in the process.

There was an understandable desire at the political level in India to downplay this diplomatic slight administered to India in Beijing in order to avoid souring the atmosphere of Prime Minister’s own visit to Washington. That hardly justified, however, the pre-emptive action by the Congress spokesperson to dismiss what transpired in China as a “casual remark” by the US president. That he reacted even before the External Affairs Ministry did shows creeping functional disarray in the making and enunciation of our foreign policy, with the centrality of the Foreign Ministry, and, in the Ministry, the stature of the External Affairs Minister himself, suffering erosion. The Ministry rightly rebuffed the US-China joint statement on India, in a low key manner no doubt, but that was understandable in the circumstances, though its force had already been diluted by the precipitate reaction of the Congress spokesperson.

Prime Minister’s Washington visit has not clarified the situation for us. An appropriately revised US position could have been weaved into the India-US joint statement, which, as it happens, excludes any mention, even proforma, of the desirability of improved India-Pakistan ties, an objective we could have subscribed to in the right context- that of “the absolute imperative to bring to justice the perpetrators of the (Mumbai) terrorist attack”. So, while Obama, overlooking our sensitivities, talks of improved India-Pakistan ties jointly with the Chinese President, this desideratum finds no place in his joint statement with our Prime Minister, this time in deference to our sensitivities!

The joint statement contains the rhetoric of a “global strategic partnership” between India and the US and goes on to declare somewhat bombastically that the “India-US partnership is indispensable for global peace and security”. Should not this logically mean US support for India’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council, the organ charged with such global responsibility? UN reform, including that of the Security Council, to reflect the realities of the 21st century is mentioned in a general way in the statement, but specifically in relation to India’s aspirations all that the US side can visualize in the indeterminate future is a stable and prosperous India ”playing an increasingly important role in international affairs”. This contrasts, incidentally, with the Bush Administration’s verbiage of making India “a global power”.

Any “nuclear deal” kind of a deliverable from this visit was rightly not expected, but the claimed “strategic partnership” could have been substantiated by, for instance, removing remaining Indian entities still under US sanctions. In the context of space cooperation this gesture would have been important. A more liberal policy with regard to transfer of high/dual use technolgies, to which India attaches great importance, could have been announced. At the joint press conference, the Prime Minister appropriately chose to underline his message publicly that the lifting of US export controls on high technology exports to India will open up vast opportunities for joint R&D, from which the US industry could benefit.

On the nuclear side, the anticipated reprocessing agreement was not announced, which if it had would have removed concerns about Obama Administration’s degree of commitment to the nuclear deal despite its reassuring statements. The joint statement makes only a perfunctory reference to the nuclear deal despite its iconic role in transforming India-US relations, but the more surprising part is the agreement of the two leaders to “expedite US firms’ participation in the implementation of this agreement”. Why US enterprises have a role in “implementing “ this agreement, not merely profiting from it commercially, is unclear. On non-proliferation issues in general, the text visibly accommodates India’s basic positions, which is a feat given the non-proliferation diehards now in key positions in the State Department. It is hard to believe though that the US seriously intends to work with India on “universal, non-discriminatory and complete nuclear disarmament”.

On the central issue of terrorism, the tough message about punishing the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack, the recognition of the threat from terrorism and violent extremism emanating from India’s neighbourhood, the articulation of the need to take resolute and credible steps “to eliminate safe havens and sanctuaries that provide shelter to terrorists and their activities” to safeguard regional peace and security, constitute progress in terms of US officially subscribing to all this jointly with us. But, US squeamishness in not mentioning Pakistan remains, whereas In the Afghanistan context, the US side refers to terrorist safe havens in Pakistan by name. This shows the distance the US has yet to travel to adopt a position on India-directed terrorism from Pakistan with conviction and clarity. Obama’s appreciation of India’s role in reconstruction and rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan rebuffs Pakistan’s propaganda about our profile in Afghanistan, to which General McChyrstal had shown receptivity.


Prime Minister’s visit to Washington has received global attention, not the least because the state dinner in his honour being the first of Obama’s Presidency excited great curiosity. US’s wooing of India, with Obama being respectful and gracious towards its Prime Minister, has been to our diplomatic advantage internationally. The visit was, therefore, quite successful in show, though in substance the results appear nuanced.

The writer is a former Foreign Secretary

Pak Makes Afghan Solution Elusive-Kanwal Sibal

“Dilemmas” and “confusion” mark President Obama’s Afghanistan policy. The “Af-Pak” policy has not worked, to the point that the term itself has been discarded by the US Administration in the face of Pakistani resentment at being equated with Afghanistan, and more importantly, Pakistan’s own instability becoming an upfront concern. Holbrooke has lost visibility. General McChrystal’s report to the Pentagon acknowledges that the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating, the Taliban have the initiative, victory cannot be achieved militarily alone, the hearts and minds of the Afghan people have to be won, the US must not be seen as an occupying power etc. He has recommended the deployment of an additional 40,000 troops to stem the Taliban tide and create an enabling environment for the more broad based people oriented strategy to work.

President Obama, fearing getting bogged down in an unwinnable war, is dithering over the demand for additional troops. The earlier optimism about successfully replicating General Petraeus’s Iraq strategy in Afghanistan- that prompted the initial despatch of 21,000 troops - has evaporated. Meanwhile, the war is becoming increasingly unpopular at home as US casualties mount. Some powerful right-wing Americans are advocating US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Others, including senior Democratic leaders, recommend moving away from counter-insurgency to counter-terrorism, involving withdrawal of troops from the countryside and regrouping them in tightly controlled urban areas. Such a strategy would mean abandoning the goals of good governance, economic development thought necessary to wean away the local population from the allurements of the Taliban, and democracy building. The aim would then be not to win the war but to deny victory to the Taliban. The already exorbitant economic cost of the war is becoming more burdensome with the US reeling under a severe economic recession. US allies are facing strong domestic opposition to any increased military deployments in Afghanistan. This makes the US’s own decision to deploy additional troops more problematic as any refusal by its allies to share the burden would generate serious strains within the western alliance.

The Obama Administration’s earlier talk of a regional solution to the Afghan problem has become muted. That would have meant that Russia, China, Iran, Central Asian countries, India, Pakistan, along with US/ISAF countries, would jointly examine the ground situation, reach a common understanding of the problem, agree on a common action plan, and most importantly, on the final outcome in Afghanistan. This is easier said than done. The US has made the major military effort so far. Even if it would want others to share the military burden, would it be willing to give up its leadership in conducting the war? Would the US accept real restraints on its autonomy of military action and command? How would the conflicting interests of regional countries be reconciled? Can a collective view be forged on dealing with the Taliban? If it is agreed that military action should be accompanied by political steps, what would be their nature?

Other countries face their own dilemmas. Russia, recognizing that the US is partly fighting the Russian battle against religious extremism, may make logistical gestures to NATO, but US success would consolidate its geo-political position in Central Asia to Russia’s disadvantage. The Central Asian states, threatened by Islamic extremists, would see their interests being served by US drive against such forces in Afghanistan, but their authoritarian regimes could feel vulnerable to a renewed US zeal for promoting democracy in the region once it entrenches itself successfully there. Iran’s interests are served by US combat against the Al Qaida/Taliban combine that draws strength from Wahabist Sunni ideology, but Iran’s encirclement increases with the consolidation of a hostile US presence in Afghanistan. China may have mounting concerns about the forces of religious extremism in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region promoting instability in Sinkiang, but bolstering US/NATO’s efforts to combat them would have to be weighed against the consolidation of the US position in the region leaving China less room to dominate it and control its resources.

Pakistan’s dilemmas are particularly acute. While all other countries would want stability in Afghanistan-not necessarily under US tutelage- Pakistan has a vested interest in a Taliban-induced instability in Afghanistan. For it the Taliban are a passport to strategic influence in Afghanistan. In its calculation, US failure in Afghanistan would mean the collapse of the pro-Indian Karzai government and the erosion of the Indian position there. The US, on the other hand, expects Pakistan to curb the Al Qaida/Taliban duo and is lavishly rewarding it for its cooperation. Pakistan has been forced to act against the Pakistani Taliban causing terrorist mayhem domestically, but evades action against the Afghan Taliban causing similar mayhem in Afghanistan. By acting against the former- a source of worry to the US because of the threat they pose to Pakistan’s internal stability and the security of its nuclear arsenal- Pakistan can seek to delay action against the latter on the plea that it is seriously fighting terror. But as US pressure on it to act against the Afghan Taliban grows with the situation in Afghanistan deteriorating, Pakistan will be caught between a stone and a hard place. It would be hoping that, in the meantime, as part of the search by western powers for an “exit strategy”, the UK promoted idea of striking a deal with the “soft core” Taliban elements would progress.

India too finds itself in a quandary. A political deal with the Taliban would legitimize their extremist religious ideology and broaden its geographical base in our neighbourhood. For India the central issue is not whether such an ideology is anti-West or not, it is, instead, its destabilizing effect within South Asia. It’s capacity to prevent a potential deal that President Karzai has also advocated as part of an intra-Afghan solution, is, however, limited. India backs the US presence in Afghanistan as it has gained influence there under its cover, but the US also prefers India to limit its profile in deference to Pakistan’s sensitivities. Building a bigger, well trained Afghan National Army(ANA) is critical to stabilizing the situation sufficiently to permit the US to “exit”, but India’s assistance in training the ANA, important for securing its future position in Afghanistan, is not favoured by the US, again with Pakistani concerns in mind. President Karzai, well disposed towards India, has India’s support, but his position has been undermined by western attacks on him for conducting a fraudulent election, rampant corruption and poor governance, even as no alternative Pashtun leader is available. India has to decide how much it could expand its existing $1.2 billion development programme in the increasingly fragile situation in Afghanistan. Should India hedge against a premature US withdrawal from Afghanistan by reviving the Russia-Iran-India nexus with members of the erstwhile Northern Alliance to counter the Taliban’s return? A regional dialogue, despite all the difficulties, would be a better framework for protecting India’s interests more durably. But, improved strategies to deal with the Afghanistan morass will falter unless US’s soft and uncertain handling of Pakistan, whose self-destructive cynical role and calculations are at the core of the problem, ends.

The writer is a former Foreign Secretary (sibalkanwal@gmail.com)

CHINA WATCH: The China Imperative? - By Subramanian Swamy

Swamyhttp://www.organiser.org/dynamic/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=283&page=12

Any two large nations have competitive aspirations and needs, and if these cannot be resolved satisfactorily then it weakens bilateral relations even if it can be cemented in the other dimensions.It is constantly said that in many ways, India and China are natural partners, being neighbours with a long boundary. More importantly, for more than 5000 years of history, the two nations were culturally and religiously interacting with each other, peacefully and normally, except for a relatively brief period of 20 years [1958-78]. This peace reigned even when India's Hindu influence spread all the way to Vietnam to countries on the periphery of China. In fact even China came under the heavy influence of Hinduised Mahayana BuddhismIndia, being a democracy, is more expressive about China than China is about India, since the press there is controlled. For example, Indians and Chinese view themselves citizens of a rising global power, and that therefore each nation should be treated as a central player in a "polycentric" multi-polar international community. Yet while many Indians openly regard China as such, the Chinese in internal Chinese language media have not articulated the same sentiment about India, leaving the impression that China does not take India seriously.The core inference from the facts narrated therein is simply this: Neither China, nor indeed India, had been honest to the other about the facts about the border throughout the decade of the 1950s, nor either had a case of any undisputed merit in the border cartographic claims. That is why Sardar Patel wrote a letter to Nehru after the Communists came to power in Beijing that India should not settle the Tibet question until the border demarcation already in the existing maps had been explicitly agreed to. Nehru in reply to Patel had rambled out a lecture on how foreign policy was different from maintaining law and order.The first requirement of an effective Indian policy towards China is to build a national consensus on how in a globalised world we define our complex of interests vis-à-vis China, to deal with the situation on the border that has dramatically changed since 1962, and also how best to communicate this consensus candidly to Chinese leaders. It is significant that while China denounces the McMahon line on the Sino-Indian border as `imperialist' it has accepted the same imperialist line in toto with Burma (Myanmar). This contradiction is explainable by the issue of Tibet.The most crucial determination in the 21st century for India is the content of the nation's relation with China in the context of the US strategic over reach and volatility of the globalised economy.It is constantly said that in many ways, India and China are natural partners, being neighbours with a long boundary. More importantly, for more than 5,000 years of history, the two nations were culturally and religiously interacting with each other, peacefully and normally, except for a relatively brief period of 20 years (1958-78).This peace reigned even when India's Hindu influence spread all the way to Vietnam to countries on the periphery of China. In fact, even China came under the heavy influence of Hinduised Mahayana Buddhism so much so that the famous poet and President of Beijing University delivered an address to Harvard University in 1936, published in the Tricentennial Celebration volumes, titled The Indianisation of China detailing disapprovingly how deep Hindu influences had penetrated in Chinese minds.No two neighbours of any size, in any continent for any period of history thus can claim such a long period of peaceful co-existence and cultural contact. This is an encouraging fact of history, that except for the bitter memory of 1962 conflict, there is no deep seated sentiment mitigating against a future strategic partnership between the world's two large continental size, fastest growing, and most populous Asian neighbouring and ancient civilizations. But are the relations chilling again?India, being a democracy is more expressive about China than China is about India, since the press there is controlled. For example, Indians and Chinese view themselves as citizens of as a rising global power, and that therefore each nation should be treated as a central player in a "polycentric" multi-polar international community. Yet, while many Indians openly regard China as such, the Chinese in internal Chinese language media have not articulated the same sentiment about India, leaving the impression that China does not take India seriously. Although for China, India could, at a future date, become a strategic partner or formidable adversary, or an economic collaborator or fierce competitor, and yet China's perception of India has not yet been explicitly articulated.Will then, in the long term, a strategic India-China relation be forged for mutual benefit be forged , and if forged today, be abandoned by China at a future date? Indians cannot be sure because of Chinese opaqueness in discourse with India. There is large trust deficit between India and China today that stands in the way of such partnership.Once China attains the economic status it wants, its leaders may want to assert its political and military clout in South Asia against Indian interests by calling in its IOUs. At present China assists Pakistan, Burma, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka with military supplies, but has not openly exercised its clout in these countries, so far, against India. But the option to do so, has been kept open by China. There is also the pending festering Sino-Indian Border Dispute that first requires resolution.The Question of Sino-IndianBorder SettlementIt would be thus appropriate to first consider the centrality of the Border Dispute in the future prospect of a durable Sino-Indian strategic partnership, as this dispute can be a triggering factor for adverse Sino-Indian relations.Between 1949 and 1957, the media in India mostly had gone by Nehru's glowing pronouncements on Sino-Indian relations. Because of his perspective, the broad masses of India had regarded the relations between the two countries as extremely cordial. But this was only apparently so, since the seeds of discord had been sown early. How these seeds had germinated since is described in my earlier study of the subject [see Chapter 3 of: India's China Perspective (Konark, 2001)].The core inference from the facts narrated therein is simply this: Neither China, nor indeed India, had been honest to the other about the facts about the border throughout the decade of the 1950s, nor either had a case of any undisputed merit in the Border cartographic claims. That is why Sardar Patel wrote a letter to Nehru after the Communists came to power in Beijing that India should not settle the Tibet question until the border demarcation already in the existing maps had been explicitly agreed to. Nehru in reply to Patel had rambled out a lecture on how foreign policy was different from maintaining law and order.China did not reveal its territorial claims, even when the two countries had negotiated and signed the 1954 Agreement on Tibet. Though it was an agreement on trade and intercourse, it was concluded in order to settle all outstanding issues and to consolidate the friendly relations between the two countries. One of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (Panchsheel) was "mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty," which clearly implied that the borders of each party to the treaty were already known to the other. Had China believed that there was a substantial territorial dispute about the Sino-Indian boundary, then that was the time to have raised the question, before solemnly pledging to respect mutually the "territorial integrity" of the other. Equally wrong was Nehru for not having explicitly raised and then clinched the border issue especially when we were clearing out of Tibet and recognising it as a province of China.In October 1954, Prime Minister Nehru while in Beijing mentioned to the Chinese leaders that he had seen some maps published in China which showed a wrong boundary between the two countries, but added that he was not worried about it, because the boundaries of India were quite clear and not a matter of argument! Such ostrich like policy is what led to the disillusionment of 1962.It was on January 23, 1959, that Mr Chou Enlai first wrote to Mr Nehru admitting that it was "true that the border question was not raised in 1954 when negotiations were being held between Chinese and Indian sides for the Agreement on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet region of China and India. This was because conditions were not yet ripe for its settlement." This was an amazing admission. Why did time become `ripe' in 1959 for the dispute to be raised? That Premier Chou did not make that clear in the letter.After administering a blistering defeat in 1962, the Chinese forces withdrew 20 kms behind the McMahon Line, which they called "the 1959 line of actual control" in the Eastern Sector, and also 20 kms behind the line of their latest position in Ladakh, which they further identified with the "1959 line of actual control" in the Western Sector. This left the Chinese in possession of 23,200 square kms of territory in Ladakh. India asked for restoration to the status quo ex-ante as of September 8, 1962 in all sectors which the Chinese rejected. A stalemate thus resulted in stated positions on the boundary dispute, that in effect remains so even today.Towards the end of December 1964, Prime Minister Chou Enlai, speaking to the National People's Congress in Beijing, called the suggestion of restoration of status quo as of September 8, 1962 "an unreasonable Indian pre-condition" and declared that China would never dismantle its posts from this area. Chou also reminded India that China had not relinquished its claim to an additional 90,000 sq. kilometres of India territory south of the McMahon Line. This territorial demand was in addition to the 23,200 sq. kms of territory in Ladakh already with China by then. Thus, the border issue, if made central to further development of Sino-Indian relations, will effectively freeze any progress toward a Sino-Indian entente.The first requirement therefore of an effective Indian policy towards China is to build a national consensus on how in a globalised world we define our complex of interests vis-à-vis China, to deal with the situation on the border that has dramatically changed since 1962, and also how best to communicate this consensus candidly to Chinese leaders. It is significant that while China denounces the McMahon line on the Sino-Indian border as `imperialist' it has accepted the same imperialist line in toto with Burma (Myanmar). This contradiction is explainable by the issue of Tibet.Second, Tibet will thus continue to play the defining role in Sino-Indian relations. The Indian government has reiterated its policy of regarding Tibet as an autonomous region of China, and that anti-China political activities by Tibetan elements would not be permitted on Indian soil. This statement of policy has been repeated during the exchange of visits by the Prime Ministers of China and India. In 2003, Prime Minister Vajpayee specifically and categorically confirmed this position while on a visit to Beijing. Yet the Chinese view the émigré government of the Dalai Lama nominees in Dharamshala, H.P., with deep suspicion. The Tibet issue enables the US to roast the Chinese dragon's belly off and on. We have to resolve this contradiction. Another contradiction is the Chinese support to Pakistan in strategic, tactical, military, civilian, nuclear and conventional dimensions. But Pakistan is increasingly looking like a failed state and primed for a Taliban-Al Qaeda take-over. Thereafter anything is possible including nuclear war. This is a contradiction that China must resolve.The third is in the resolution of competitive interests between China and India both in the economy and spheres of influence. Any two large nations have competitive aspirations and needs, and if these cannot be resolved satisfactorily then it weakens bilateral relations even if it can be cemented in the other dimensions.And finally, the fourth dimension is in matching of expectations that will exist between the peoples of the two nations. If one nation assumes that friendship means totality of convergence or submergence of all national interests, while the other nation expects it to be on purely give and take principle, then the relation between such two nations is bound to sour sooner or later because the expectations are not matched. That unfortunately is what happened in Sino-Indian bilateral affairs.The scenario of Strategic partnership between India and ChinaA fundamental problem in Indian policy-making towards China is that there is no apparent consensus in India even today, on the "end" objectives of engagement with China. The domestic strategic discourse in IDSA and other think tanks so far has also failed to come up with a clear criterion for evaluating the "means" to be adopted in this regard. There is also as yet no clear China perspective inside the Indian Government. It is in this context that a review of contemporary Sino-Indian relations is urgently necessary before developing a stable strategic `Sino-Indian Partnership', that everyone blandly talks about nowadays.In particular, a crucial choice will have to be made soon by us: Whether India should form a compact with China (Choice I) or become a part of the US efforts to keep China `contained' (Choice II). How and why that choice is to be made must of course be subject to in depth of the analysis and wide national debate. I am of the view that either India befriends China in a fundamental and strategic sense, or Indian confronts China. There is no third way.The upshot of the entire analysis given above can thus be summarised in three parts: [a] A strategic partnership between India and China has to be viewed in dimensions of economic, global influence, and national security. Hence, to opt for such a partnership there has to be a holistic approach.[b] For historical, cultural and geographical reasons, it is natural for India and China to be partners in global affairs. It is, however, too early for India to clinch a strategic partnership with China because of some unresolved contradictions, the upheaval in the international economy triggered by globalisation and more importantly the imminence of a financial crisis in China and India about which I have written elsewhere [see my Financial Architecture and Comparative Economic Development of China and India (2007) Konark Publishers]. Thus, bilateral discussions for this partnership at all important levels should take place only after all scenarios are visualised and issues are thrashed out to avoid future misunderstanding.[c] For the time being, the US is important as a market and as a pioneer in innovative technology. Hence, it is not a feasible for either India or China to come to any understanding that is inconsistent with US global interest. This is more true for China than India because the former is more vitally interlinked with the US economy and foreign trade with the West and pro-US East Asia. Thus, mature and nuanced sequencing of our relations with China to a level of a stable and sustained strategic partnership is the urgent imperative of India's new age or 21st century diplomacy.(The writer is former Union Cabinet Minister for Commerce, and is currently Janata Party President.)

Truth About Doctored CDs and Gita For Gandhis: Election Potpourri RK Ohri

The mysterious appearance of an allegedly ‘doctored’ CD is being used by our Hindu-bashing media to defame and condemn Varun Gandhi, the bright young B J P aspirant wanting to contest election for the Lok Sabha seat from Pilibhit. In this comical debate the media has conveniently forgotten that a number of similarly doctored CDs are being openly sold in hundreds across Pilibhit and several U.P. towns. According to a news published on March 22, 2009, in Hindustan Times, New Delhi, a CD of the so-called ‘hate’ speech of Varun Gandhi was being sold for Rs. 15,000 and several political parties and mediapersons were lapping up the coveted CDs.1 On top of it, the buyers are openly telling the CD seller, one Maqbool, to “delete this scene, it will not serve my purpose”. And such openly ‘doctored’ CDs are being unabashedly purchased by the election campaigners for three well known political parties. Yet not one media analyst has tried to fathom the origin of the ‘dubious’ CD, nor who prepared it and why, nor where is the original CD. All these questions have been left unanswered by the Indian media as well as the Election Commission.

How is it that the Election Commission and our voluble media analysts have not bothered to investigate what made the cyber café owner, Maqbool of Pilibhit, openly doctor and modify CDs of Varun’s speech for selling them like hot cakes to all and sundry ? Most mysterious, however, is the inaction of the somnolent Uttar Pradesh police who have neither caught Maqbool, nor interrogated him. One does not know either how many Maqbools across Uttar Pradesh have ventured into the dubious CD doctoring business and are busy hawking the modified CDs.

We are indeed living in bewildering times. True to their anti-Hindu agenda, some media mavericks have even tried to pitch Priyanka Gandhi against her cousin, Varun, by bringing into question Varun’s knowledge of Gita - a subject on which a lot can be said.

Frankly, not many media analysts appear to have any sound knowledge of Gita, nor of the bold message of recourse to karmic action it gives to Hindus like Varun. No wonder they fail to realize that in not too distant past the same message had fired the imagination of the renowned stalwarts like Lokmanya Tilak, Aurobindo Ghosh, Ras Behari Bose and hundreds of revolutionaries and freedom fighters, including Chandra Shekhar Azad, Bhagat Singh, Sukhdev, Rajguru, Ram Prasad Bismal and lakhs of foot soldiers of our freedom movement.

After conversion to the hollow western creed called ‘secularism’, most media WOGs (i.e., West Oriented Gentlemen) have lost their civilizational moorings. In their

1




static minds ‘ahimsa parmo dharmo’, a truncated shloka popularized by Mahatma
Gandhi, remains etched as the central theme of Gita. They seem to be blissfully unaware that Gita goes far beyond ‘ahimsa parmo dharma’ and gloriously sanctions the use of violence as a sacred duty in the cause of righteousness, especially for protecting ‘Dharma’. As highlighted by Swami Chinmayananda in a soul stirring article, the correct Shloka in Gita is ‘Ahimsa Parmo Dharma, Dharmah Himsa Tathaiva Cha’, meaning thereby that recourse to violence for protecting ‘Dharma’ is an equally important duty enjoined upon all Hindus.2 The learned sage bemoans that frequent misuse of this truncated sacred verse has reduced us Indians (read Hindus) to the status of “poltroons and cowards”.3 By over emphasizing non-violence, says Swamiji, “we have reached the pathetic situation of today when thousands, in cowardly fear take to precipitate flight, leaving their innocent children to be butchered and their unarmed helpless women to be converted or killed”.4

The rousing speech of Varun Gandhi has to be understood in the context of the pitiable condition of Hindus of Pilibhit. In recent months there have been innumerable complaints by Hindus of Pilibhit alleging oppression by Muslim gangsters of the area, including scores of instances of cow slaughter which is forbidden by law. But no one listens to Hindus because the District Magistrate and Additional District Magistrate of Pilibhit, being Muslims, are perceived to be ranged against the majority community. In such a dismal scenario, the courage shown by Varun came like a whiff of fresh air for the beseiged Hindus of Pilibhit.

It is time that voluble journos and politicos realized that there is a healthy unanimity of views between what Varun Gandhi told the beleaguered Hindus of Pilibhit and what the learned Swami Chinmayananda upholds as our grand civilizational ideal, enshrined in Bhagvad Gita.

Though Priyanka Gandhi did not say anthing about her own understanding of Gita, apparently she does not know much about the bold and valorous message to fight the forces of evil given by Sri Krishna to Arjun on the battlefield of Kurukshetra. Gita does not preach passivity or renunciation, nor submission to tyranny. It preaches action, bold and purposeful, for achieving victory against tyranny. Instead of faulting Varun, she would do well to listen to the sagely advice of Swami Chinmayananda when he says that “the only solution for the day’s internal chaos is to bring home to the people the significance of the much neglected teaching of ‘dharma-himsa’. Gita gives the message of victory through valour to every Hindu, loudly and clearly, exhorting them to join the battle when no other option is available.

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And that is what Varun Gandhi has been trying to do by relaying the wake up call to oppressed Hindu masses, besieged by jihadi terrorists and enemies of Dharma. It is time that our ignorant media analysts devoted a little bit of their time to re-reading of the Gita, instead of faulting Varun’s knowledge of the sacred Song Divine.





***********


References:

Rajesh Kumar Singh, ‘Varun speech a bestseller”, Hindustan Times, New Delhi,
March 22, 2009, p. 9.

Source: chinmayananda.org

Ibid.
Ibid.

PRISM ON PAKISTAN: Pervez spoke in India to be heard in Pak BY Vikram Sood

http://www.asianage.com/presentation/leftnavigation/

opinion/opinion/pervez-spoke-in-india-to-be-heard-in-pak.aspx
March.24 : Pakistani performers — singers and musicians — unable to get a break in their own country would often come to India. Ghulam Ali, Mehdi Hassan and Nusrat Fateh Ali Khan made it big once they had entertained and been appreciated by Indian audiences. It is here that their art flourished and only then were they recognised in their own country. Pervez Musharraf was only the latest of such performers. His goal, however, was different. He was here to impress dwindling audiences back home with his belligerence on "enemy soil" and regain relevance in Pakistani politics. One does not know whether this was the audacity of hope or the harsh reality of a future imperfect of a floundering Pakistan that continues to seek enemies. After the usual bellicosity, meant for his hardline audience in Pakistan, he offered himself as its next President, provided that he was made a "real" President. This was a humble offer to serve the nation in any post so long as he could live in the Aiwan-e-Sadr.Many do not know that the general has been a fan of Clint Eastwood, but the difference is that this general shoots from the lip. That is why he got into all sorts of tangles during his marathon and excruciatingly boring session at the India Today Conclave in New Delhi earlier this month. It was obvious that the general does not know how to answer awkward questions except by being offensive. After he gave his rambling and muddled worldview (he did refer to South America to show the breadth of his vision), he talked of confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan. When it was suggested to Gen. Musharraf that Pakistan make a declaration of faith by handing over Dawood Ibrahim, a clearly flustered general, after the usual evasive tactics, said even if Dawood were handed over relations would not improve. This was a tacit admission of fact. His argument was that since India was supposed to be in touch with Brahmdag Bugti, this allowed Pakistan to harbour an international criminal. Unfortunately, no one then asked him about the various Sikh extremists like Lakhbir Singh Rhode of the International Sikh Youth Federation who continues to live under Pakistan's loving care in Lahore, or Wadhawan Singh Babbar of Babbar Khalsa International and others whose well-being is supervised by Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir (Retd), a former director-general of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).Later, he elevated himself as an arbiter between India and Pakistan but also threatened more Kargils if Pakistan was not granted what it demanded. A man cannot be a peacenik and also threaten war. However, the general promised that relations could improve if Kashmir was handed over to Pakistan. Justice thy name is Pervez Musharraf!The general also feigned injured innocence about how Bangladesh got its independence — alluding to Indian intervention but conveniently omitting the fact the Pakistan Army had killed three million innocent Bangladeshis before the Indian Army stepped in. Other contradictions featured. For instance, according to the general, the ISI and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) are alike, and he later went on to say that the Army and the ISI were the centres of gravity in Pakistan. That is the core issue in Pakistan — the power of the Army as an institution and the pelf of Pakistan Army officers. Surely, the general must know that in India neither the Army nor RAW are "centres of gravity". The people are the centre of gravity.Gen. Musharraf, imaginative with the truth, also said that terrorist organisations like Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammed were born because of India. He did not add that weapons and training for the Lashkar came via the ISI and loads of Saudi money went into the Jamaat-ud-Dawa. But the world knows this.The one person who immediately understood what Gen. Musharraf was trying was Rajya Sabha MP Maulana Mahmood Madani. And he was quite forthright when he said that the general was beginning his career in Pakistani politics in India. Mr Musharraf was livid with rage when the maulana proceeded to tell the general that his gratuitous advice about how to handle problems was not only not needed, it was detrimental to Muslims in India, where the majority had defended them. A flustered, angry and truculent Gen. Musharraf then accused the maulana of hypocrisy. Yet the general's Army and its terrorist surrogates have killed more Muslims in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Afghanistan than any other country anywhere else in the world. And since it is still a work-in-progress, Pakistan has ceased to have the right to call itself a "defender of the faith" a long time ago.In his autobiography In the Line of Fire (which borrows its title from Clint Eastwood's Academy Award-winning film about a psychopath wanting to assassinate the US President), the general modestly describes himself as a statesman, a quality that was singularly absent when he answered questions about the Mumbai massacre. He did not have a single word of sympathy for the innocents who were killed; there was no condemnation of the act of terror, nor the terrorists. Instead, he launched into a tirade against the Indian media, politicians and everyone else for this war "hysteria" against Pakistan. But for decades now Pakistan has inculcated enmity and obscurantism by consistently teaching its young jihad and hatred in madrasas and mainstream schools; leaders of various jihadi outfits have constantly spoken of the need to conquer and divide India; and the general himself, when in power, had referred to India as the "enemy".Events seem to have upset the general's ambitions to make a triumphant return to Pakistan politics as the now-rejuvenated Supreme Court may want to ask a few awkward questions about his unconstitutional orders in November 2007. One wonders if he still has space in Neharwali Galli.
Vikram Sood is a former Cheif of RAW, India's external intelligence agency

TIME TO DETOXIFY AS WELL AS DISCIPLINE PAKISTAN

VIKRAM SOOD


Pakistan is in deep trouble. As has been said before, the trouble this time is worse than in 1971. This time there is no fall back position because in 1971 there was a West Pakistan to come home to. The retreat from the Swat Valley by the Pakistani state is a sign of the troubled times and was perhaps pre-ordained. In intelligence parlance it is called ‘blowback’ – the unintended consequences of unacknowledged actions in other peoples countries.’

This time the admission comes from on high when the President of Pakistan says he fears a Taliban take over in Pakistan and that Pakistan was fighting for its survival. He should worry because the Taliban control Swat which is 160 kilometers away from Islamabad. To put this in the Indian perspective, it is like them sitting in Agra or a little beyond that. Simultaneously, there have been reports in Pakistan of the Taliban having infiltrated into the Punjab and Karachi. Killings and kidnappings continue, in FATA, in NWFP and in Balochistan where a nascent nationalist struggle is again visible. Worried that the Taliban were infiltrating into the Punjab province, Pakistani authorities have sent their Elite Force to the borders with NWFP and Balochistan to prevent these infiltrations. The economy is collapsing there and is no succour forthcoming either from the Americans or from the Friends of Pakistan unless Pakistan shows good faith.

Pakistan has shown progress only in one category. The Washington-based Fund for Peace now lists Pakistan at 9 in the list of failing/failed states, up from 10 two years ago. Thus we have a delinquent state that is also a failing state as our neighbour and that too a neighbour where hatred for India has been a habit. The sooner we accept this unfortunate reality the better it will be or easier, one hopes, to formulate serious long-term responses and immediate pre-emption. Today, Pakistan is a metaphor for “ground zero of terrorism” or “epicenter of terrorism.”

Pakistanis themselves have been in denial for long and so have we been; assuming that Pakistan was a moderate liberal state and that what was happening in that country would eventually pass. This is not going to be so. For this one has to read what Pervez Hoodbhoy, the well known physics professor at the Quaid e Azam University in Islamabad, says in his essay ‘The Saudi-isation of Pakistan’. He begins his essay with the ominous prediction – “The common belief in Pakistan is that Islamic radicalism is a problem only in FATA, and that the madrassas are the only institutions serving as jihad factories. This is a serious misconception. Extremism is breeding at a ferocious rate in public and private schools within Pakistan’s cities. Left unchallenged this education will produce a generation incapable of coexisting with any one except strictly with their own kind. The mindset it creates, may eventually lead to Pakistan’s demise as a nation state.” Hoodbhoy’s anguish is obvious when he says “Grain by grain the desert sands of Saudi Arabia are replacing the rich soil that had nurtured a magnificent Muslim culture for a thousand years….. Now a stern unyielding version of Islam (Wahhabism) is replacing the kinder, gentler Islam of the Sufis and saints who had walked on this land for hundreds of years.” This is an essay every Indian, and any one else who cares must read; not to exult in what is happening in Pakistan but to worry.

It is true that Pakistan was formed in the name of Islam and all its various leaders have used Islam for political ends. Quite early in Pakistan’s life criticising Pakistan meant criticism of Islam. This weakened the civil society. Undoubtedly Zia was the one who converted this into a strong instrument of state policy but right from the beginning Pakistan’s leaders tried to deny history and even geography when they sought their moorings elsewhere. Fear of India, the urge to be different and the search for an identity that was non-India led to the rise of the Army with the result that today the Army is the institution that owns Pakistan. And it looks increasingly that Pakistan’s latest attempt at democracy is about to flounder.

Many Pakistani leaders have been spreading the theory that India is about to reverse the partition and gobble up Pakistan. They flatter themselves. It is also a self-serving argument that encourages the retention of a huge self-aggrandising Army and feeds a feudal system. No right minded Indian would ever dream of taking over that desolate piece of territory whose sole harvest now is jihadi terrorists and hatred towards others.

Pakistani leaders never wanted to or failed to understand that their country would remain the safest when they confined themselves to adventures within their own boundaries. Pakistan becomes unstable the moment it pretends to be the inheritor of the Empire and seeks suzerainty over Afghanistan or seeks to cut India down to size. The pursuit of policies other than in one’s own national interest usually damages that national interest.

The US will most likely continue to repeat earlier mistakes – not having learnt anything and forgotten everything. Only the other day Richard Holbrooke was telling us (even though he was on a learning mission) that India and Pakistan face the same threat. Not quite, Mr. Holbrooke. We are victims of Pakistani-inspired, funded and equipped terrorism. Pakistan, on the other hand is a victim of its own policies, which for long spells were ignored and indirectly abetted by the US by the very fact that they were ignored. Anxious to achieve results in Afghanistan as soon as possible, it is likely that the Americans will be satisfied if Pakistan shows results in the war on terror, west of the Indus. This will be a mistake. Unless the Pakistanis tackle terrorism east of the Indus, dismantle the large infrastructure of terrorism and hunt down the terrorists the problem will never go away. Instead of this, what we have are peace deals even on the other side of the Indus facing the Afghan border. The US needs to change policy too from the earlier one of routinely plying the country with funds for misuse and arms for regional adventurism. Maybe Pakistan needs to be starved of both for some time till it is adequately disciplined and detoxified.

Meanwhile, Pakistan is looking more and more like a failed joint venture of the Anglo-Americans who spent most of the second half of the last century investing more and more in keeping this country afloat. The Pakistani melt down looks increasingly like the Lehman Brothers collapse and this country too must go into international receivership with stern conditionalities of sustained good behaviour which, above all, must make India safe from future depredations – sub-conventional, conventional and nuclear – by that country and Kashmir is not on the table.

Vikram Sood is a former Cheif of RAW, India's external intelligence agency

THE RELENTLESS MARCH OF DOGMA-JP Sharma

Commenting on the extraordinary development of a religious institution ( Lal Masjid and its Jamia Hafsa seminary) in Pakistan’s capital city seeking to order the local populace to observe the Islamic mores of conduct and morality, Pakistani human rights activist I A Rehman highlighted (Dawn 5 April 2007) the basic problem with which rulers of Pakistan have been trying to grapple ever since the creation of the state.

“Within yards of the avenue in the capital where the concrete symbols of all the organs of the state are guarded by large contingents of gendarmerie, some lathi-wielding female students take the law into their hands, and announce their assumption of authority to detain and punish the ‘sinners’, and a pathetic-looking state apparatus sues for forgiveness. This is Pakistan after seven years of stability, economic progress, genuine democracy, suppression of obscurantism and enlightened moderation…”

Rehman asserts that the development is only yet another stage in the evolution of the Theory of Two Sovereignties which has been gradually gathering strength in Pakistan. According to Rehman the Theory postulates that “every Pakistani Muslim has a right and a duty to bring his fellow-beings under a regime he thinks his belief prescribes even if this involves a defiance of the state-made (that is, man-made) laws and rules”.

GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM

Rehman argues that the seeds of the problem were contained in the politics which led to the creation of Pakistan. The demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims of India was plainly based on religion. The leaders who whipped up communal frenzy to gather support for their project did not spend much time elaborating the constitutional features of the new country they were trying to create. Most of the slogans raised during the 1945-46 elections explained the idea of Pakistan only in religious terms. Throughout its history the use of highly emotive Islamic slogans (e,g, Pakistan ka matlab kya; La Ilah Illillah ) by the religion based parties/groups for mobilizing the faithful has been a constant feature of politics in Pakistan.
Jinnah was by no means a staunch Muslim. It appears that having used the appeal of Islam for securing support of his co-religionists, he quickly realized the dangers of creating an Islam dominated state and sought to put the new state on a safer course with his famous Constituent Assembly speech of August 11, 1947, declaring that all citizens of Pakistan will be equal regardless of their religious affiliation. Jinnah did not live long enough to steer Pakistan in its early years. Most Pakistanis paid homage to Jinnah as the Father of the Nation but Jinnah’s lone speech, which went completely against the tenor of the Pakistan movement stood little chance of finding acceptance by the large body of the fired up soldiers of Islam. The Objectives Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly in March 1949 sought to please the Islamists by declaring that “principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam” shall be fully observed and ..” the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah”. The Resolution simultaneously sought to assure the minorities that everyone
“.. shall be guaranteed fundamental rights including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality; and
“… adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures;” and,.
“….. adequate provision shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes;..”
THE DILEMMA OF CONSTITUTION MAKERS
The Objectives Resolution aptly illustrates the dilemma faced by the constitution makers of Pakistan. Produced by politicians still swearing loyalty to the departed Jinnah, and possibly not to wanting to upset the western progenitors of Pakistan, the Resolution attempted to reconcile the utterly contradictory demands of Islam and secularism although the language used made the primacy of Islam quite apparent. In actual practice, however, Islam unquestionably predominated and the provisions in favour of the minorities remained only pious, ornamental, paper declarations.
WHAT THE MINORITIES ACTUALLY GOT
A direct consequence of the overarching position accorded to Islam was the power and prestige accruing to those who could authoritatively spell out the "teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah;” Experts in the Islamic field, the ulema, were in plentiful supply and lost no opportunity of practising their art. To press for the observance of Islamic injunctions in matters of governance, the Ulema of different schools organized themselves into political groupings with their respective agenda. Prominent among such parties were the Jamaat-e-Islami (led by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, widely regarded as the greatest modern ideologue of Islamic fundamentalism), the Jamiat-ul- Ulema Islam, (JUI) led by Mufti Mahmood, representing ulema of the Deobandi school, and Jamiat-ul Ulema Pakistan (JUP) representing the Barelvi School of ulemas. There were some minor religious parties also.
HINDU-SIKHS
Even though Pakistan was not formally declared an Islamic state until 1956, Islamism was on the march right from the beginning. Islam does not look kindly on dissent and treats unbelievers harshly. The passions roused by the Partition and the widespread violence and misery that followed in its wake naturally took their toll on the Hindu-Sikh minorities who could find safety of life, liberty and honour only beyond the borders of Pakistan. The Population of Hindus and Sikhs estimated to range around 15-25% in 1947 fell quickly coming down to about 1.5% by the 1990’s.
CHRISTIANS
Christians had a relatively comfortable time in Pakistan’s early years. This was due to several factors. Christians of Punjab and Sind had vigorously supported the demand for Pakistan. Christian journalists like Pothan Joseph had been particularly helpful to the Muslim League. The influence of Pakistan’s western benefactors must have also counted. Again, Islam regards Christians and Jews as ahle-kitab (people of the Book) and places them in a class higher than the unbelievers.
With the growth of pro-Palestine and anti-American feelings in Pakistan the local Christian community also started feeling the heat. But it was the notorious blasphemy laws enacted under Zia-ul-Haq regime that made the life of Christians miserable. Christians and churches too became targets of attack. As the fundamentalist organizations gathered strength such attacks became more frequent..
AHMADIS
It was not only the religious minorities that were subjected to persecution. Minority sects among the Muslims too became victims of the puritan zealots. The first such group to suffer were the Qadianis or Ahmedis. Founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmed of Qadian (a small town in Gurdaspur district of Indian Punjab) in 1889, the sect propagated a milder version of Islam and won many adherents from the ranks of educated Muslims. Pakistan’s first Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan and Nobel Laureate Professor Abdus Salam were both Ahmadis as also were many of Pakistan’s 1965 war heroes. In 1953 a fundamentalist group called Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam raised the demand that Ahmadis be declared to be non-Muslims as they believed in the Prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed. Other Mullahs led by Jamat-e-Islami’s Maulana Abul Ala Maududi supported the demand. Fierce anti-Qadiani riots broke out in Lahore in which could be quelled only after the declaration of Martial Law. The Mullas however kept their agitation alive and there were countrywide anti Ahmadi riots in 1974. P M Z A Bhutto who led the PPP government, bought peace by enacting a law declaring Ahmadis as Non Muslims. More stringent anti Ahmadi laws were enacted under Zia ul Haq’s Islamization programme.
SHIAS
Hostility between the Sunnis and the Shias, the two major sects of Muslims, originating with the dispute regarding the succession after the death of Prophet Mohammed had been continuing throughout Islamic history. With Khomeini’s successful revolution in Shiite Iran in 1979 the Shia Sunni rivalry received a big boost. Sunni dominated Pakistan, where Saudi Arabia was a big player, became the theatre where the policies of the patrons of the two sides led to persistent violent sectarian clashes. The Shias suffered not only because they were in a weak minority but also because of the blatantly partisan attitude of the Pakistan government
DISPENSATION OF JUSTICE
IA Rehman’s article vividly describes the situation obtaining in Pakistan after the enactment of the blasphemy laws;
”During the latter half of the eighties a new idea for enforcing amr-bil-ma’aroof wa nahi-anil-munkir was introduced to Pakistan’s conservative lobby after the insertion of the blasphemy provision into the Penal Code. According to the groups dominant in Pakistan, apostasy is punishable with death and any Muslim is supposed to be free to act as the prosecutor, the judge and the executioner although no law permits this. This view was confirmed when a judge reprimanded a person for only accusing a man of blasphemy and not killing him.”The case of a non-Muslim does not fall in the category of apostasy and yet it has been assumed that a Pakistani Muslim has a right to execute a non-Muslim as well as a fellow Muslim by declaring him guilty of blasphemy. The state has been guilty of criminal inaction and silence over the actions taken by individuals under cover of belief. Zafar Iqbal died in jail in circumstances that suggested murder, the killer of Naimat Ahmar was lionised in prison, a blasphemy accused was killed in a Lahore prison, another was lynched by a mob in Gujranwala, and a third was killed by the policeman who was supposed to protect the wretch from the mob and take him to a lock-up……”
PROGRESSIVE RISE IN THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAM IN JUDICIAL SYSTEM
During the 1950’s the Constitution attached comparatively greater weight to protection of people’s fundamental rights as against the requirement of no law being repugnant to Islam. As the years went by the Islamic sentiment kept getting strengthened. An important step in the modification of the judicial system was the setting up of the Council of Islamic Ideology which was authorized to decide whether any law was repugnant to Islam and to recommend corrective measures. Zia-ul Haq lifted the movement to a higher level by setting up Sharia Courts although his plan to enact the 9th Amendment which sought to make the injunctions of Islam the supreme law of the land and source of guidance for legislation and policy making could not be put into practice before his death. Yet another attempt to introduce amr- bil- ma’aroof wa nahi- anil- munkir (the authority to prescribe what is right and to forbid what is wrong) into the Constitution was made in 1998 by the Islamist democratically elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief while another Islamist, Rafiq Tarar ,was holding the office of the President of Pakistan. Commanding a huge majority in the National Assembly, Nawaz Sharief could get the 15th Amendment Bill passed by the Lower House but the Senate rejected the Bill. The MMA led NWFP government has been trying to introduce the same laws by its proposed HASBA Bill.

RELENTLESS MARCH OF DOGMA –II

Current reports in the English press in Pakistan reflect considerable concern over the growing Talibanization of Pakistan. In its editorial of 25 May 2007 The Daily Times lamented the people’s failure to realize that Pakistan is losing territory to the Talibanization wave which having won the Tribal areas is now threatening the settled areas and even Islamabad. Blaming the military for nurturing the Taliban in pursuit of their policy of “strategic depth” the editorial observes ..
“ Much before “strategic depth” came to grief, these military leaders allowed the city of Karachi to be taken over repeatedly by the local “Taliban” trained in the seminaries there. Pakistan could not “deal” with the Taliban; it could only surrender to them. The seminaries that trained the Taliban leaders of Kandahar and prepared their minds were in Pakistan.”

PERSECUTION FOR BELIEF

The worry over the impending Talibanization seems to be restricted to the liberal segments of the Pakistani “civil society” who wish to preserve their available freedoms in mundane matters of dress, appearance, eating, drinking, entertainment or the other innocent pleasures of life. It is not known how numerically large this segment is or how strong is their commitment to the cause of liberalism. There are of course some well known fearless crusaders for human rights and freedoms but they seem to be in a microscopic minority.

The Pakistani press and political leadership routinely seek to convince the world that except for the Mullahs, Pakistani people are by and large secular and broadminded in their outlook as evidenced by the fact that the religion based parties have never achieved any significant success in any election. Equally common is the prescription of democracy to meet the looming Talibanization threat. Both these facile propositions seem to proceed from the desire to avoid a discussion of the real cause perhaps because that would involve treading on dangerous ground. The stark truth is that irrespective of the character of the government, legislation in Pakistan on matters of faith has moved only in one direction--- becoming more and more harsh and oppressive for those who happened to subscribe to beliefs other than those approved by the dominant majority. Appropriation by the Islamic vigilantes of the authority to enforce the sharia or to punish the errant Muslims for acts deemed to be forbidden by Islam is only a higher stage in the progression which started with the Objectives Resolution, led to the enactment of blasphemy laws, setting up of Sharia courts and the growing clout of the devout clerics and their followers.

RELIGION RELATED OFFENCES AND ATTITUDES OF THE JUDICIARY

Besides the constitutional changes declaring Pakistan to be an Islamic State, Islam being declared as the state religion, debarring members of the minority communities from holding high offices etc. many new laws were put on the statute book which in effect negated the so called guarantees to minorities and resulted in their persecution for their beliefs and practices. The most glaring examples of such laws are the provisions in the Pakistan Penal Code dealing with “Offences relating to religion” viz. sections 295-B (Defiling ,etc. of copy of Holy Quran ), 295-C ( Use of derogatory remarks etc. in respect of the Holy Prophet) , 298-A (Use of derogatory remarks, etc. in respect of holy personages ), 298-B (Misuse of epithet, descriptions and titles, etc. reserved for certain holy personages or places), and 298 –C (Person of Qadiani group, etc, calling himself a Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith). While sections 295-B, 295-C and 298-A are of general applicability, sections 298-B, 298-C are specifically applicable to Ahmadis/Lahoris. Anybody accused of having committed any of the offences dealt with in the above sections can be arrested without warrant and held without bail. Blaspheming the Prophet carries an obligatory death sentence. The vast sweep of the offences makes accusation quite easy and defending against accusation extremely difficult. Section 298-C for example prescribes that “ Any person of the Qadiani ….. who directly or indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, …… or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims….…shall be punished...”

The Islamic fervour is shared by many judges and is reflected in their judgments. In 2000, a judge of the Lahore High Court is reported to have publicly stated that anyone accused of blasphemy should be killed on the spot by Muslims as a religious obligation and that there was no need for any legal proceedings in such cases.(The statement was later reportedly retracted)

THE SUPRA LEGAL ZEALOTS

The situation is compounded by the courts and defence lawyers being threatened by Muslim zealots. In fact a High Court Judge who courageously acquitted two Christians accused of blasphemy ended up being assassinated. For those accused of blasphemy, acquittal by court is not the end of the story. Mullahs are quick to issue fatwas enjoining the killing of alleged blasphemers even after their acquittal by courts. And to cap it all the state refuses to interfere. According to The Daily Times (27 May 2007) --..

“ …..The man who scared everyone off the Sangla Hill crime is Lahore’s most powerful cleric and the government literally whimpers obsequiously when confronting him. In Karachi, the judge who threw a number of Shia in jail for possessing a classical account of their imams, could have been beaten up by the clergy waiting outside if he had let them go. Blasphemy is no vent for private grievances; it is a crime of a religious state that no ruler has the guts to eliminate…”
CAN DEMOCRACY BE THE SOLUTION
While the military is rightly blamed for being largely responsible for the present situation it does not appear that restoration of democracy will bring secularism or at least arrest the trend towards Talibanization. Leaving aside the chaotic period 1949-58 during which the bureaucrats ruled the country under a democratic façade, Pakistan has had a few spells of democracy--- normal democracy under ZA Bhutto (1972-77): and limited democracy (with military oversight) under Benazir Bhutto (1988-90) and (1993-96) and Nawaz Sharief (1990-93) and (1997-99). None of these democratically elected leaders could be accused of having promoted secularism or done anything to check the propagation of hate. During the ZA Bhutto watch the Ahmadis were legally declared non-Muslims: Benazir Bhutto presided over the creation of the Taliban: and Nawaz Sharief (in addition to having the Supreme Court stormed by his goons) almost succeeded with his 15th Amendment of the Constitution seeking to make the Holy Quran and Sunnah the supreme law of the land and directing the government to enforce amr bil ma’roof wa nahi anil munkar (prescribing what is right and forbidding what is wrong).

NO MORE THE LUNATIC FRINGE

Two unmistakable and constant features of Pakistan’s polity have been---(a) the vigorous hold of Islam on the masses and (b) the resort to Islam by Pakistan’s rulers to mobilize support for their purposes. Having been constantly fed the Islamic diet from the press, platform, pulpit and schools (government run or the deeni kind), the desire for Talibanization of the Muslim society has come to be shared by increasing sections of the Pakistani Muslims. Again to quote the Daily Times (02 June 2007)
…. “There is a lot of confusion in Pakistan over understanding the nature of violence in the country. What the Taliban want in the Tribal Areas is articulated in the mosques of the big cities in the settled areas. At any given time in Lahore, for instance, you will hear demands for the setting up of precisely the kind of governance demanded by the Taliban and implemented in the tribal areas. Most of us think that this kind of worldview in Lahore comes from fringe elements, but on close examination more and more people are embracing this discourse as their key to replacing the present “America-enslaved” system.”

Obviously it will require much more than the replacement of Musharraf with a civilian politician at the head of Pakistan government to pull the country back from the brink of the abyss.