Pak Makes Afghan Solution Elusive-Kanwal Sibal
“Dilemmas” and “confusion” mark President Obama’s Afghanistan policy. The “Af-Pak” policy has not worked, to the point that the term itself has been discarded by the US Administration in the face of Pakistani resentment at being equated with Afghanistan, and more importantly, Pakistan’s own instability becoming an upfront concern. Holbrooke has lost visibility. General McChrystal’s report to the Pentagon acknowledges that the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating, the Taliban have the initiative, victory cannot be achieved militarily alone, the hearts and minds of the Afghan people have to be won, the US must not be seen as an occupying power etc. He has recommended the deployment of an additional 40,000 troops to stem the Taliban tide and create an enabling environment for the more broad based people oriented strategy to work.
President Obama, fearing getting bogged down in an unwinnable war, is dithering over the demand for additional troops. The earlier optimism about successfully replicating General Petraeus’s Iraq strategy in Afghanistan- that prompted the initial despatch of 21,000 troops - has evaporated. Meanwhile, the war is becoming increasingly unpopular at home as US casualties mount. Some powerful right-wing Americans are advocating US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Others, including senior Democratic leaders, recommend moving away from counter-insurgency to counter-terrorism, involving withdrawal of troops from the countryside and regrouping them in tightly controlled urban areas. Such a strategy would mean abandoning the goals of good governance, economic development thought necessary to wean away the local population from the allurements of the Taliban, and democracy building. The aim would then be not to win the war but to deny victory to the Taliban. The already exorbitant economic cost of the war is becoming more burdensome with the US reeling under a severe economic recession. US allies are facing strong domestic opposition to any increased military deployments in Afghanistan. This makes the US’s own decision to deploy additional troops more problematic as any refusal by its allies to share the burden would generate serious strains within the western alliance.
The Obama Administration’s earlier talk of a regional solution to the Afghan problem has become muted. That would have meant that Russia, China, Iran, Central Asian countries, India, Pakistan, along with US/ISAF countries, would jointly examine the ground situation, reach a common understanding of the problem, agree on a common action plan, and most importantly, on the final outcome in Afghanistan. This is easier said than done. The US has made the major military effort so far. Even if it would want others to share the military burden, would it be willing to give up its leadership in conducting the war? Would the US accept real restraints on its autonomy of military action and command? How would the conflicting interests of regional countries be reconciled? Can a collective view be forged on dealing with the Taliban? If it is agreed that military action should be accompanied by political steps, what would be their nature?
Other countries face their own dilemmas. Russia, recognizing that the US is partly fighting the Russian battle against religious extremism, may make logistical gestures to NATO, but US success would consolidate its geo-political position in Central Asia to Russia’s disadvantage. The Central Asian states, threatened by Islamic extremists, would see their interests being served by US drive against such forces in Afghanistan, but their authoritarian regimes could feel vulnerable to a renewed US zeal for promoting democracy in the region once it entrenches itself successfully there. Iran’s interests are served by US combat against the Al Qaida/Taliban combine that draws strength from Wahabist Sunni ideology, but Iran’s encirclement increases with the consolidation of a hostile US presence in Afghanistan. China may have mounting concerns about the forces of religious extremism in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region promoting instability in Sinkiang, but bolstering US/NATO’s efforts to combat them would have to be weighed against the consolidation of the US position in the region leaving China less room to dominate it and control its resources.
Pakistan’s dilemmas are particularly acute. While all other countries would want stability in Afghanistan-not necessarily under US tutelage- Pakistan has a vested interest in a Taliban-induced instability in Afghanistan. For it the Taliban are a passport to strategic influence in Afghanistan. In its calculation, US failure in Afghanistan would mean the collapse of the pro-Indian Karzai government and the erosion of the Indian position there. The US, on the other hand, expects Pakistan to curb the Al Qaida/Taliban duo and is lavishly rewarding it for its cooperation. Pakistan has been forced to act against the Pakistani Taliban causing terrorist mayhem domestically, but evades action against the Afghan Taliban causing similar mayhem in Afghanistan. By acting against the former- a source of worry to the US because of the threat they pose to Pakistan’s internal stability and the security of its nuclear arsenal- Pakistan can seek to delay action against the latter on the plea that it is seriously fighting terror. But as US pressure on it to act against the Afghan Taliban grows with the situation in Afghanistan deteriorating, Pakistan will be caught between a stone and a hard place. It would be hoping that, in the meantime, as part of the search by western powers for an “exit strategy”, the UK promoted idea of striking a deal with the “soft core” Taliban elements would progress.
India too finds itself in a quandary. A political deal with the Taliban would legitimize their extremist religious ideology and broaden its geographical base in our neighbourhood. For India the central issue is not whether such an ideology is anti-West or not, it is, instead, its destabilizing effect within South Asia. It’s capacity to prevent a potential deal that President Karzai has also advocated as part of an intra-Afghan solution, is, however, limited. India backs the US presence in Afghanistan as it has gained influence there under its cover, but the US also prefers India to limit its profile in deference to Pakistan’s sensitivities. Building a bigger, well trained Afghan National Army(ANA) is critical to stabilizing the situation sufficiently to permit the US to “exit”, but India’s assistance in training the ANA, important for securing its future position in Afghanistan, is not favoured by the US, again with Pakistani concerns in mind. President Karzai, well disposed towards India, has India’s support, but his position has been undermined by western attacks on him for conducting a fraudulent election, rampant corruption and poor governance, even as no alternative Pashtun leader is available. India has to decide how much it could expand its existing $1.2 billion development programme in the increasingly fragile situation in Afghanistan. Should India hedge against a premature US withdrawal from Afghanistan by reviving the Russia-Iran-India nexus with members of the erstwhile Northern Alliance to counter the Taliban’s return? A regional dialogue, despite all the difficulties, would be a better framework for protecting India’s interests more durably. But, improved strategies to deal with the Afghanistan morass will falter unless US’s soft and uncertain handling of Pakistan, whose self-destructive cynical role and calculations are at the core of the problem, ends.
The writer is a former Foreign Secretary (sibalkanwal@gmail.com)
President Obama, fearing getting bogged down in an unwinnable war, is dithering over the demand for additional troops. The earlier optimism about successfully replicating General Petraeus’s Iraq strategy in Afghanistan- that prompted the initial despatch of 21,000 troops - has evaporated. Meanwhile, the war is becoming increasingly unpopular at home as US casualties mount. Some powerful right-wing Americans are advocating US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Others, including senior Democratic leaders, recommend moving away from counter-insurgency to counter-terrorism, involving withdrawal of troops from the countryside and regrouping them in tightly controlled urban areas. Such a strategy would mean abandoning the goals of good governance, economic development thought necessary to wean away the local population from the allurements of the Taliban, and democracy building. The aim would then be not to win the war but to deny victory to the Taliban. The already exorbitant economic cost of the war is becoming more burdensome with the US reeling under a severe economic recession. US allies are facing strong domestic opposition to any increased military deployments in Afghanistan. This makes the US’s own decision to deploy additional troops more problematic as any refusal by its allies to share the burden would generate serious strains within the western alliance.
The Obama Administration’s earlier talk of a regional solution to the Afghan problem has become muted. That would have meant that Russia, China, Iran, Central Asian countries, India, Pakistan, along with US/ISAF countries, would jointly examine the ground situation, reach a common understanding of the problem, agree on a common action plan, and most importantly, on the final outcome in Afghanistan. This is easier said than done. The US has made the major military effort so far. Even if it would want others to share the military burden, would it be willing to give up its leadership in conducting the war? Would the US accept real restraints on its autonomy of military action and command? How would the conflicting interests of regional countries be reconciled? Can a collective view be forged on dealing with the Taliban? If it is agreed that military action should be accompanied by political steps, what would be their nature?
Other countries face their own dilemmas. Russia, recognizing that the US is partly fighting the Russian battle against religious extremism, may make logistical gestures to NATO, but US success would consolidate its geo-political position in Central Asia to Russia’s disadvantage. The Central Asian states, threatened by Islamic extremists, would see their interests being served by US drive against such forces in Afghanistan, but their authoritarian regimes could feel vulnerable to a renewed US zeal for promoting democracy in the region once it entrenches itself successfully there. Iran’s interests are served by US combat against the Al Qaida/Taliban combine that draws strength from Wahabist Sunni ideology, but Iran’s encirclement increases with the consolidation of a hostile US presence in Afghanistan. China may have mounting concerns about the forces of religious extremism in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region promoting instability in Sinkiang, but bolstering US/NATO’s efforts to combat them would have to be weighed against the consolidation of the US position in the region leaving China less room to dominate it and control its resources.
Pakistan’s dilemmas are particularly acute. While all other countries would want stability in Afghanistan-not necessarily under US tutelage- Pakistan has a vested interest in a Taliban-induced instability in Afghanistan. For it the Taliban are a passport to strategic influence in Afghanistan. In its calculation, US failure in Afghanistan would mean the collapse of the pro-Indian Karzai government and the erosion of the Indian position there. The US, on the other hand, expects Pakistan to curb the Al Qaida/Taliban duo and is lavishly rewarding it for its cooperation. Pakistan has been forced to act against the Pakistani Taliban causing terrorist mayhem domestically, but evades action against the Afghan Taliban causing similar mayhem in Afghanistan. By acting against the former- a source of worry to the US because of the threat they pose to Pakistan’s internal stability and the security of its nuclear arsenal- Pakistan can seek to delay action against the latter on the plea that it is seriously fighting terror. But as US pressure on it to act against the Afghan Taliban grows with the situation in Afghanistan deteriorating, Pakistan will be caught between a stone and a hard place. It would be hoping that, in the meantime, as part of the search by western powers for an “exit strategy”, the UK promoted idea of striking a deal with the “soft core” Taliban elements would progress.
India too finds itself in a quandary. A political deal with the Taliban would legitimize their extremist religious ideology and broaden its geographical base in our neighbourhood. For India the central issue is not whether such an ideology is anti-West or not, it is, instead, its destabilizing effect within South Asia. It’s capacity to prevent a potential deal that President Karzai has also advocated as part of an intra-Afghan solution, is, however, limited. India backs the US presence in Afghanistan as it has gained influence there under its cover, but the US also prefers India to limit its profile in deference to Pakistan’s sensitivities. Building a bigger, well trained Afghan National Army(ANA) is critical to stabilizing the situation sufficiently to permit the US to “exit”, but India’s assistance in training the ANA, important for securing its future position in Afghanistan, is not favoured by the US, again with Pakistani concerns in mind. President Karzai, well disposed towards India, has India’s support, but his position has been undermined by western attacks on him for conducting a fraudulent election, rampant corruption and poor governance, even as no alternative Pashtun leader is available. India has to decide how much it could expand its existing $1.2 billion development programme in the increasingly fragile situation in Afghanistan. Should India hedge against a premature US withdrawal from Afghanistan by reviving the Russia-Iran-India nexus with members of the erstwhile Northern Alliance to counter the Taliban’s return? A regional dialogue, despite all the difficulties, would be a better framework for protecting India’s interests more durably. But, improved strategies to deal with the Afghanistan morass will falter unless US’s soft and uncertain handling of Pakistan, whose self-destructive cynical role and calculations are at the core of the problem, ends.
The writer is a former Foreign Secretary (sibalkanwal@gmail.com)
Labels: Kanwal Sibal
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