WRAPPING IS BETTER THAN THE PRODUCT -Kanwal Sibal

Prime Minister’s visit to Washington from November 22 to 26 went as expected. It produced neither excitement nor disappointment on substantive issues. There were no surprises either by way of achieving less than what was hoped for, or more. If the visit looked for assurance that the India-US relationship would not lose steam under the Obama Administration, that assurance was forthcoming.

Disquieting signals from Obama of either poor understanding of India’s concerns on vital issues, or his conscious disregard of them, were reinforced by the joint statement issued during his November visit to China in which he endorsed China’s role in improving relations between India and Pakistan. A country unwilling to improve ties durably with India by settling the border issue on realistic terms is being touted by the US as a positive external force in helping improve our ties with Pakistan. Why should China want to do that when it has strategically used Pakistan effectively against us all these years and a rising India could cast a shadow on China’s radiance? The subsequent clarification that China does not wish to intervene in India-Pakistan differences etc is either usual Chinese double speak or the US seeks a Chinese role in India-Pakistan relations as it wants progress there for creating more favourable conditions for pursuing its wobbling Af-Pak strategy.

In any case, touching India’s raw nerve just before Prime Minister’s visit to Washington was not only ill-timed, it was also clumsy diplomacy as the joint statement implicitly rejected India’s core position that India-Pakistan problems had to be settled bilaterally, put India in a subordinate position vis a vis a China increasingly assertive in its claims over Arunachal Pradesh, and equated India and Pakistan in terms of responsibility for existing tensions. It also contradicts US’s official position that India and Pakistan have to settle their differences on their own, and that while the US favoured resumption of dialogue and reconciliation, it did not seek to intervene in the process.

There was an understandable desire at the political level in India to downplay this diplomatic slight administered to India in Beijing in order to avoid souring the atmosphere of Prime Minister’s own visit to Washington. That hardly justified, however, the pre-emptive action by the Congress spokesperson to dismiss what transpired in China as a “casual remark” by the US president. That he reacted even before the External Affairs Ministry did shows creeping functional disarray in the making and enunciation of our foreign policy, with the centrality of the Foreign Ministry, and, in the Ministry, the stature of the External Affairs Minister himself, suffering erosion. The Ministry rightly rebuffed the US-China joint statement on India, in a low key manner no doubt, but that was understandable in the circumstances, though its force had already been diluted by the precipitate reaction of the Congress spokesperson.

Prime Minister’s Washington visit has not clarified the situation for us. An appropriately revised US position could have been weaved into the India-US joint statement, which, as it happens, excludes any mention, even proforma, of the desirability of improved India-Pakistan ties, an objective we could have subscribed to in the right context- that of “the absolute imperative to bring to justice the perpetrators of the (Mumbai) terrorist attack”. So, while Obama, overlooking our sensitivities, talks of improved India-Pakistan ties jointly with the Chinese President, this desideratum finds no place in his joint statement with our Prime Minister, this time in deference to our sensitivities!

The joint statement contains the rhetoric of a “global strategic partnership” between India and the US and goes on to declare somewhat bombastically that the “India-US partnership is indispensable for global peace and security”. Should not this logically mean US support for India’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council, the organ charged with such global responsibility? UN reform, including that of the Security Council, to reflect the realities of the 21st century is mentioned in a general way in the statement, but specifically in relation to India’s aspirations all that the US side can visualize in the indeterminate future is a stable and prosperous India ”playing an increasingly important role in international affairs”. This contrasts, incidentally, with the Bush Administration’s verbiage of making India “a global power”.

Any “nuclear deal” kind of a deliverable from this visit was rightly not expected, but the claimed “strategic partnership” could have been substantiated by, for instance, removing remaining Indian entities still under US sanctions. In the context of space cooperation this gesture would have been important. A more liberal policy with regard to transfer of high/dual use technolgies, to which India attaches great importance, could have been announced. At the joint press conference, the Prime Minister appropriately chose to underline his message publicly that the lifting of US export controls on high technology exports to India will open up vast opportunities for joint R&D, from which the US industry could benefit.

On the nuclear side, the anticipated reprocessing agreement was not announced, which if it had would have removed concerns about Obama Administration’s degree of commitment to the nuclear deal despite its reassuring statements. The joint statement makes only a perfunctory reference to the nuclear deal despite its iconic role in transforming India-US relations, but the more surprising part is the agreement of the two leaders to “expedite US firms’ participation in the implementation of this agreement”. Why US enterprises have a role in “implementing “ this agreement, not merely profiting from it commercially, is unclear. On non-proliferation issues in general, the text visibly accommodates India’s basic positions, which is a feat given the non-proliferation diehards now in key positions in the State Department. It is hard to believe though that the US seriously intends to work with India on “universal, non-discriminatory and complete nuclear disarmament”.

On the central issue of terrorism, the tough message about punishing the perpetrators of the Mumbai attack, the recognition of the threat from terrorism and violent extremism emanating from India’s neighbourhood, the articulation of the need to take resolute and credible steps “to eliminate safe havens and sanctuaries that provide shelter to terrorists and their activities” to safeguard regional peace and security, constitute progress in terms of US officially subscribing to all this jointly with us. But, US squeamishness in not mentioning Pakistan remains, whereas In the Afghanistan context, the US side refers to terrorist safe havens in Pakistan by name. This shows the distance the US has yet to travel to adopt a position on India-directed terrorism from Pakistan with conviction and clarity. Obama’s appreciation of India’s role in reconstruction and rebuilding efforts in Afghanistan rebuffs Pakistan’s propaganda about our profile in Afghanistan, to which General McChyrstal had shown receptivity.


Prime Minister’s visit to Washington has received global attention, not the least because the state dinner in his honour being the first of Obama’s Presidency excited great curiosity. US’s wooing of India, with Obama being respectful and gracious towards its Prime Minister, has been to our diplomatic advantage internationally. The visit was, therefore, quite successful in show, though in substance the results appear nuanced.

The writer is a former Foreign Secretary

Pak Makes Afghan Solution Elusive-Kanwal Sibal

“Dilemmas” and “confusion” mark President Obama’s Afghanistan policy. The “Af-Pak” policy has not worked, to the point that the term itself has been discarded by the US Administration in the face of Pakistani resentment at being equated with Afghanistan, and more importantly, Pakistan’s own instability becoming an upfront concern. Holbrooke has lost visibility. General McChrystal’s report to the Pentagon acknowledges that the situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating, the Taliban have the initiative, victory cannot be achieved militarily alone, the hearts and minds of the Afghan people have to be won, the US must not be seen as an occupying power etc. He has recommended the deployment of an additional 40,000 troops to stem the Taliban tide and create an enabling environment for the more broad based people oriented strategy to work.

President Obama, fearing getting bogged down in an unwinnable war, is dithering over the demand for additional troops. The earlier optimism about successfully replicating General Petraeus’s Iraq strategy in Afghanistan- that prompted the initial despatch of 21,000 troops - has evaporated. Meanwhile, the war is becoming increasingly unpopular at home as US casualties mount. Some powerful right-wing Americans are advocating US withdrawal from Afghanistan. Others, including senior Democratic leaders, recommend moving away from counter-insurgency to counter-terrorism, involving withdrawal of troops from the countryside and regrouping them in tightly controlled urban areas. Such a strategy would mean abandoning the goals of good governance, economic development thought necessary to wean away the local population from the allurements of the Taliban, and democracy building. The aim would then be not to win the war but to deny victory to the Taliban. The already exorbitant economic cost of the war is becoming more burdensome with the US reeling under a severe economic recession. US allies are facing strong domestic opposition to any increased military deployments in Afghanistan. This makes the US’s own decision to deploy additional troops more problematic as any refusal by its allies to share the burden would generate serious strains within the western alliance.

The Obama Administration’s earlier talk of a regional solution to the Afghan problem has become muted. That would have meant that Russia, China, Iran, Central Asian countries, India, Pakistan, along with US/ISAF countries, would jointly examine the ground situation, reach a common understanding of the problem, agree on a common action plan, and most importantly, on the final outcome in Afghanistan. This is easier said than done. The US has made the major military effort so far. Even if it would want others to share the military burden, would it be willing to give up its leadership in conducting the war? Would the US accept real restraints on its autonomy of military action and command? How would the conflicting interests of regional countries be reconciled? Can a collective view be forged on dealing with the Taliban? If it is agreed that military action should be accompanied by political steps, what would be their nature?

Other countries face their own dilemmas. Russia, recognizing that the US is partly fighting the Russian battle against religious extremism, may make logistical gestures to NATO, but US success would consolidate its geo-political position in Central Asia to Russia’s disadvantage. The Central Asian states, threatened by Islamic extremists, would see their interests being served by US drive against such forces in Afghanistan, but their authoritarian regimes could feel vulnerable to a renewed US zeal for promoting democracy in the region once it entrenches itself successfully there. Iran’s interests are served by US combat against the Al Qaida/Taliban combine that draws strength from Wahabist Sunni ideology, but Iran’s encirclement increases with the consolidation of a hostile US presence in Afghanistan. China may have mounting concerns about the forces of religious extremism in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region promoting instability in Sinkiang, but bolstering US/NATO’s efforts to combat them would have to be weighed against the consolidation of the US position in the region leaving China less room to dominate it and control its resources.

Pakistan’s dilemmas are particularly acute. While all other countries would want stability in Afghanistan-not necessarily under US tutelage- Pakistan has a vested interest in a Taliban-induced instability in Afghanistan. For it the Taliban are a passport to strategic influence in Afghanistan. In its calculation, US failure in Afghanistan would mean the collapse of the pro-Indian Karzai government and the erosion of the Indian position there. The US, on the other hand, expects Pakistan to curb the Al Qaida/Taliban duo and is lavishly rewarding it for its cooperation. Pakistan has been forced to act against the Pakistani Taliban causing terrorist mayhem domestically, but evades action against the Afghan Taliban causing similar mayhem in Afghanistan. By acting against the former- a source of worry to the US because of the threat they pose to Pakistan’s internal stability and the security of its nuclear arsenal- Pakistan can seek to delay action against the latter on the plea that it is seriously fighting terror. But as US pressure on it to act against the Afghan Taliban grows with the situation in Afghanistan deteriorating, Pakistan will be caught between a stone and a hard place. It would be hoping that, in the meantime, as part of the search by western powers for an “exit strategy”, the UK promoted idea of striking a deal with the “soft core” Taliban elements would progress.

India too finds itself in a quandary. A political deal with the Taliban would legitimize their extremist religious ideology and broaden its geographical base in our neighbourhood. For India the central issue is not whether such an ideology is anti-West or not, it is, instead, its destabilizing effect within South Asia. It’s capacity to prevent a potential deal that President Karzai has also advocated as part of an intra-Afghan solution, is, however, limited. India backs the US presence in Afghanistan as it has gained influence there under its cover, but the US also prefers India to limit its profile in deference to Pakistan’s sensitivities. Building a bigger, well trained Afghan National Army(ANA) is critical to stabilizing the situation sufficiently to permit the US to “exit”, but India’s assistance in training the ANA, important for securing its future position in Afghanistan, is not favoured by the US, again with Pakistani concerns in mind. President Karzai, well disposed towards India, has India’s support, but his position has been undermined by western attacks on him for conducting a fraudulent election, rampant corruption and poor governance, even as no alternative Pashtun leader is available. India has to decide how much it could expand its existing $1.2 billion development programme in the increasingly fragile situation in Afghanistan. Should India hedge against a premature US withdrawal from Afghanistan by reviving the Russia-Iran-India nexus with members of the erstwhile Northern Alliance to counter the Taliban’s return? A regional dialogue, despite all the difficulties, would be a better framework for protecting India’s interests more durably. But, improved strategies to deal with the Afghanistan morass will falter unless US’s soft and uncertain handling of Pakistan, whose self-destructive cynical role and calculations are at the core of the problem, ends.

The writer is a former Foreign Secretary (sibalkanwal@gmail.com)

THE DIVIDE IN KASHMIR

- Borders are relevant till the reasons to violate them disappear
Kanwal Sibal

The current turmoil in Jammu and Kashmir began with the blatantly communal reaction in the valley to the decision to transfer a mere 40 hectares of land to the Amarnath Shrine Board for creating temporary structures for the convenience of the pilgrims. That the valley Muslims could at all believe that this decision could have the potential, even remotely, to change the demographics of Jammu and Kashmir, is astonishing. For 60 years the government of India has meticulously observed its constitutional obligations to not disturb the demography of Jammu and Kashmir by permitting Indians from the rest of the country to purchase property and settle down permanently in the state. That separatist propaganda can so easily negate this record of good faith shows how futile it is to continue making core concessions to win the hearts and minds of the valley Kashmiris.
China, in Tibet next door, has changed the territory’s demography by settling Hans there in large numbers, reducing the Tibetans to a minority in Lhasa. It is ruthlessly exploiting Tibet’s natural resources, ignoring environmental norms. China has interfered with the practice of Lamaist Buddhism, destroying numerous monasteries during the Cultural Revolution in a bid to “modernize” Tibet. Its policies are guided essentially by security considerations, to establish an iron grip on the territory and neutralize any challenge to its authority there.
India’s policies have been incomparably more humane than China’s. India could have steadily changed the state’s demography, early after Independence, by settling there the Sikh population displaced from Pakistan. After 1965 and 1971, India could have taken hardheaded security-related decisions to ward off future dangers. India took no decisions with demographic implications even with Pakistan openly abetting terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir post-1990 and introducing a new level of challenge to the Indian State. The reverse demographic change brought about by the eviction of the Kashmiri Pandits from the valley has still not been undone.
The land in question at unlivable heights belongs to the Jammu and Kashmir state, not to any single religious community. Those “nationalist” Kashmiri leaders, who argue that their opposition is not “communal” as they oppose not the yatra but the transfer of land, are being specious. How can they oppose the yatra? Even the Chinese government allows the Mansarovar yatra, and that too in Tibet, the source of territorial tensions between India and China. Why does the valley oppose the land transfer? Because the decision is not that of a legitimate government? Because displacement of already settled people will take place? Because no precedent exists for any transfer of “forest” land for a public purpose? Because the reason for transfer is not good enough as more facilities for the pilgrims are not necessary? Or do the valley inhabitants consider that the land itself is “Muslim” and its use for offering better facilities to Hindus from outside is simply not palatable? Don’t the Hindus of Jammu and Kashmir have a say in the matter as citizens of the state?
Many ascribe the alienation of the Kashmiris to India’s shortchanging them regarding democracy by rigging elections. But any “rigging” affects the entire state, not a particular community. Why should one community feel specially aggrieved? Have the people of Jammu or Ladakh been alienated because Indian democracy has let them down? Once again, the real reasons are being obfuscated in order to find an exculpation for the militancy of the Muslim community. Separatist feelings in the valley existed long before any disenchantment with Indian democracy set in. Militancy was inspired by the rise of religious extremism in the region following the success of the Taliban. Sheikh Abdullah was not a paragon of democratic conduct. Those who practise mosque-based politics are not democrats. The insistence on Article 370 was motivated to a degree by a desire to rule Jammu and Kashmir as a fiefdom, outside the influence of India’s more egalitarian constitutional democracy. During the current turmoil, the street mobilization of people through the network of mosques is not democracy in action. Is Geelani’s Islamic ranting compatible with democracy? Mirwaiz is by no means a secular democratic leader. The demand for self-determination should not be conflated with democracy. After all Pakistan, whose own democratic credentials are questionable, has been in the forefront in asking for self-determination in Jammu and Kashmir — but not in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Self-determination is a political tool for the separatist agenda. If the Muslims were not in majority in the valley would they ask for self- determination?
The Indian government, faced with the extremely difficult challenge of controlling a state with separatist leanings buttressed by powerful foreign forces, may not have always acted according to the democratic rule-book. But in so many other ways it has shown remarkable sensitivity to Kashmiri aspirations, and so a total view should be taken. The problem in essence is the capacity of the valley Muslims, with their overwhelming local majority, to pursue a self-centred agenda, unmindful of the larger interests of Jammu and Kashmir, its Hindu and Buddhist population, or of the nation as a whole. If the population of the valley were Hindus and not Muslims, would shortchanging them of democracy have led to secessionism? Would reconciliation have eluded both sides for 60 years? Why is a compromise not possible?
The powerful agitation in Jammu against the decision to rescind the land transfer and the temporary dislocation of movement of goods to and from the valley has incited full-blown secessionism there. Propaganda about the so-called economic blockade of the valley was unleashed to provoke a separatist surge. The aim of the secessionists was to go on the offensive by creating an emotive issue and deflecting attention away from their own initial guilt. The valley Muslims have long disowned any responsibility for the exodus of the Pandits. The government of India’s inability to redress the situation has in all likelihood contributed to the lack of regard in the valley for the religious sentiments of the Jammu Hindus on the land transfer issue. The moment there was some show of strength in Jammu, the valley Muslims have retaliated with a seditious campaign of massive proportions, knowing killings in police firing will reinforce the sense of victimhood of the community, besides drawing international attention to their cause.
India’s internal peace and security and its international reputation have suffered at the hands of the Kashmiri secessionists for decades. Their challenge to the Indian State and popular sentiment continues unabated. The government’s task is no doubt inordinately difficult. But laws must be enforced, otherwise democracy, already a ‘soft’ system of governance, can slip into non-governance. Why are we giving a free run to the secessionists? Their pro-Pakistan demand for opening the Muzaffarabad road mocks at our sovereignty. It is a logical extension of policies to encourage cross-contacts over the line of control without first firmly controlling the political situation on the ground on our side. Why nurture the notion of a united Kashmir? Why help the Kashmiris create a common platform with Pakistanis in PoK? Will this make the Kashmiris as a whole more loyal to India? Borders remain relevant until the reason to violate them disappears.

The writer is former foreign secretary of India
THIS ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN A WEEK BEFORE THE AMARNATH AGREEMENT