THE RELENTLESS MARCH OF DOGMA-JP Sharma

Commenting on the extraordinary development of a religious institution ( Lal Masjid and its Jamia Hafsa seminary) in Pakistan’s capital city seeking to order the local populace to observe the Islamic mores of conduct and morality, Pakistani human rights activist I A Rehman highlighted (Dawn 5 April 2007) the basic problem with which rulers of Pakistan have been trying to grapple ever since the creation of the state.

“Within yards of the avenue in the capital where the concrete symbols of all the organs of the state are guarded by large contingents of gendarmerie, some lathi-wielding female students take the law into their hands, and announce their assumption of authority to detain and punish the ‘sinners’, and a pathetic-looking state apparatus sues for forgiveness. This is Pakistan after seven years of stability, economic progress, genuine democracy, suppression of obscurantism and enlightened moderation…”

Rehman asserts that the development is only yet another stage in the evolution of the Theory of Two Sovereignties which has been gradually gathering strength in Pakistan. According to Rehman the Theory postulates that “every Pakistani Muslim has a right and a duty to bring his fellow-beings under a regime he thinks his belief prescribes even if this involves a defiance of the state-made (that is, man-made) laws and rules”.

GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM

Rehman argues that the seeds of the problem were contained in the politics which led to the creation of Pakistan. The demand for a separate homeland for the Muslims of India was plainly based on religion. The leaders who whipped up communal frenzy to gather support for their project did not spend much time elaborating the constitutional features of the new country they were trying to create. Most of the slogans raised during the 1945-46 elections explained the idea of Pakistan only in religious terms. Throughout its history the use of highly emotive Islamic slogans (e,g, Pakistan ka matlab kya; La Ilah Illillah ) by the religion based parties/groups for mobilizing the faithful has been a constant feature of politics in Pakistan.
Jinnah was by no means a staunch Muslim. It appears that having used the appeal of Islam for securing support of his co-religionists, he quickly realized the dangers of creating an Islam dominated state and sought to put the new state on a safer course with his famous Constituent Assembly speech of August 11, 1947, declaring that all citizens of Pakistan will be equal regardless of their religious affiliation. Jinnah did not live long enough to steer Pakistan in its early years. Most Pakistanis paid homage to Jinnah as the Father of the Nation but Jinnah’s lone speech, which went completely against the tenor of the Pakistan movement stood little chance of finding acceptance by the large body of the fired up soldiers of Islam. The Objectives Resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly in March 1949 sought to please the Islamists by declaring that “principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice as enunciated by Islam” shall be fully observed and ..” the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah”. The Resolution simultaneously sought to assure the minorities that everyone
“.. shall be guaranteed fundamental rights including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality; and
“… adequate provision shall be made for the minorities to profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures;” and,.
“….. adequate provision shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of minorities and backward and depressed classes;..”
THE DILEMMA OF CONSTITUTION MAKERS
The Objectives Resolution aptly illustrates the dilemma faced by the constitution makers of Pakistan. Produced by politicians still swearing loyalty to the departed Jinnah, and possibly not to wanting to upset the western progenitors of Pakistan, the Resolution attempted to reconcile the utterly contradictory demands of Islam and secularism although the language used made the primacy of Islam quite apparent. In actual practice, however, Islam unquestionably predominated and the provisions in favour of the minorities remained only pious, ornamental, paper declarations.
WHAT THE MINORITIES ACTUALLY GOT
A direct consequence of the overarching position accorded to Islam was the power and prestige accruing to those who could authoritatively spell out the "teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunnah;” Experts in the Islamic field, the ulema, were in plentiful supply and lost no opportunity of practising their art. To press for the observance of Islamic injunctions in matters of governance, the Ulema of different schools organized themselves into political groupings with their respective agenda. Prominent among such parties were the Jamaat-e-Islami (led by Maulana Abul Ala Maududi, widely regarded as the greatest modern ideologue of Islamic fundamentalism), the Jamiat-ul- Ulema Islam, (JUI) led by Mufti Mahmood, representing ulema of the Deobandi school, and Jamiat-ul Ulema Pakistan (JUP) representing the Barelvi School of ulemas. There were some minor religious parties also.
HINDU-SIKHS
Even though Pakistan was not formally declared an Islamic state until 1956, Islamism was on the march right from the beginning. Islam does not look kindly on dissent and treats unbelievers harshly. The passions roused by the Partition and the widespread violence and misery that followed in its wake naturally took their toll on the Hindu-Sikh minorities who could find safety of life, liberty and honour only beyond the borders of Pakistan. The Population of Hindus and Sikhs estimated to range around 15-25% in 1947 fell quickly coming down to about 1.5% by the 1990’s.
CHRISTIANS
Christians had a relatively comfortable time in Pakistan’s early years. This was due to several factors. Christians of Punjab and Sind had vigorously supported the demand for Pakistan. Christian journalists like Pothan Joseph had been particularly helpful to the Muslim League. The influence of Pakistan’s western benefactors must have also counted. Again, Islam regards Christians and Jews as ahle-kitab (people of the Book) and places them in a class higher than the unbelievers.
With the growth of pro-Palestine and anti-American feelings in Pakistan the local Christian community also started feeling the heat. But it was the notorious blasphemy laws enacted under Zia-ul-Haq regime that made the life of Christians miserable. Christians and churches too became targets of attack. As the fundamentalist organizations gathered strength such attacks became more frequent..
AHMADIS
It was not only the religious minorities that were subjected to persecution. Minority sects among the Muslims too became victims of the puritan zealots. The first such group to suffer were the Qadianis or Ahmedis. Founded by Mirza Ghulam Ahmed of Qadian (a small town in Gurdaspur district of Indian Punjab) in 1889, the sect propagated a milder version of Islam and won many adherents from the ranks of educated Muslims. Pakistan’s first Foreign Minister Zafarullah Khan and Nobel Laureate Professor Abdus Salam were both Ahmadis as also were many of Pakistan’s 1965 war heroes. In 1953 a fundamentalist group called Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam raised the demand that Ahmadis be declared to be non-Muslims as they believed in the Prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed. Other Mullahs led by Jamat-e-Islami’s Maulana Abul Ala Maududi supported the demand. Fierce anti-Qadiani riots broke out in Lahore in which could be quelled only after the declaration of Martial Law. The Mullas however kept their agitation alive and there were countrywide anti Ahmadi riots in 1974. P M Z A Bhutto who led the PPP government, bought peace by enacting a law declaring Ahmadis as Non Muslims. More stringent anti Ahmadi laws were enacted under Zia ul Haq’s Islamization programme.
SHIAS
Hostility between the Sunnis and the Shias, the two major sects of Muslims, originating with the dispute regarding the succession after the death of Prophet Mohammed had been continuing throughout Islamic history. With Khomeini’s successful revolution in Shiite Iran in 1979 the Shia Sunni rivalry received a big boost. Sunni dominated Pakistan, where Saudi Arabia was a big player, became the theatre where the policies of the patrons of the two sides led to persistent violent sectarian clashes. The Shias suffered not only because they were in a weak minority but also because of the blatantly partisan attitude of the Pakistan government
DISPENSATION OF JUSTICE
IA Rehman’s article vividly describes the situation obtaining in Pakistan after the enactment of the blasphemy laws;
”During the latter half of the eighties a new idea for enforcing amr-bil-ma’aroof wa nahi-anil-munkir was introduced to Pakistan’s conservative lobby after the insertion of the blasphemy provision into the Penal Code. According to the groups dominant in Pakistan, apostasy is punishable with death and any Muslim is supposed to be free to act as the prosecutor, the judge and the executioner although no law permits this. This view was confirmed when a judge reprimanded a person for only accusing a man of blasphemy and not killing him.”The case of a non-Muslim does not fall in the category of apostasy and yet it has been assumed that a Pakistani Muslim has a right to execute a non-Muslim as well as a fellow Muslim by declaring him guilty of blasphemy. The state has been guilty of criminal inaction and silence over the actions taken by individuals under cover of belief. Zafar Iqbal died in jail in circumstances that suggested murder, the killer of Naimat Ahmar was lionised in prison, a blasphemy accused was killed in a Lahore prison, another was lynched by a mob in Gujranwala, and a third was killed by the policeman who was supposed to protect the wretch from the mob and take him to a lock-up……”
PROGRESSIVE RISE IN THE INFLUENCE OF ISLAM IN JUDICIAL SYSTEM
During the 1950’s the Constitution attached comparatively greater weight to protection of people’s fundamental rights as against the requirement of no law being repugnant to Islam. As the years went by the Islamic sentiment kept getting strengthened. An important step in the modification of the judicial system was the setting up of the Council of Islamic Ideology which was authorized to decide whether any law was repugnant to Islam and to recommend corrective measures. Zia-ul Haq lifted the movement to a higher level by setting up Sharia Courts although his plan to enact the 9th Amendment which sought to make the injunctions of Islam the supreme law of the land and source of guidance for legislation and policy making could not be put into practice before his death. Yet another attempt to introduce amr- bil- ma’aroof wa nahi- anil- munkir (the authority to prescribe what is right and to forbid what is wrong) into the Constitution was made in 1998 by the Islamist democratically elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief while another Islamist, Rafiq Tarar ,was holding the office of the President of Pakistan. Commanding a huge majority in the National Assembly, Nawaz Sharief could get the 15th Amendment Bill passed by the Lower House but the Senate rejected the Bill. The MMA led NWFP government has been trying to introduce the same laws by its proposed HASBA Bill.

RELENTLESS MARCH OF DOGMA –II

Current reports in the English press in Pakistan reflect considerable concern over the growing Talibanization of Pakistan. In its editorial of 25 May 2007 The Daily Times lamented the people’s failure to realize that Pakistan is losing territory to the Talibanization wave which having won the Tribal areas is now threatening the settled areas and even Islamabad. Blaming the military for nurturing the Taliban in pursuit of their policy of “strategic depth” the editorial observes ..
“ Much before “strategic depth” came to grief, these military leaders allowed the city of Karachi to be taken over repeatedly by the local “Taliban” trained in the seminaries there. Pakistan could not “deal” with the Taliban; it could only surrender to them. The seminaries that trained the Taliban leaders of Kandahar and prepared their minds were in Pakistan.”

PERSECUTION FOR BELIEF

The worry over the impending Talibanization seems to be restricted to the liberal segments of the Pakistani “civil society” who wish to preserve their available freedoms in mundane matters of dress, appearance, eating, drinking, entertainment or the other innocent pleasures of life. It is not known how numerically large this segment is or how strong is their commitment to the cause of liberalism. There are of course some well known fearless crusaders for human rights and freedoms but they seem to be in a microscopic minority.

The Pakistani press and political leadership routinely seek to convince the world that except for the Mullahs, Pakistani people are by and large secular and broadminded in their outlook as evidenced by the fact that the religion based parties have never achieved any significant success in any election. Equally common is the prescription of democracy to meet the looming Talibanization threat. Both these facile propositions seem to proceed from the desire to avoid a discussion of the real cause perhaps because that would involve treading on dangerous ground. The stark truth is that irrespective of the character of the government, legislation in Pakistan on matters of faith has moved only in one direction--- becoming more and more harsh and oppressive for those who happened to subscribe to beliefs other than those approved by the dominant majority. Appropriation by the Islamic vigilantes of the authority to enforce the sharia or to punish the errant Muslims for acts deemed to be forbidden by Islam is only a higher stage in the progression which started with the Objectives Resolution, led to the enactment of blasphemy laws, setting up of Sharia courts and the growing clout of the devout clerics and their followers.

RELIGION RELATED OFFENCES AND ATTITUDES OF THE JUDICIARY

Besides the constitutional changes declaring Pakistan to be an Islamic State, Islam being declared as the state religion, debarring members of the minority communities from holding high offices etc. many new laws were put on the statute book which in effect negated the so called guarantees to minorities and resulted in their persecution for their beliefs and practices. The most glaring examples of such laws are the provisions in the Pakistan Penal Code dealing with “Offences relating to religion” viz. sections 295-B (Defiling ,etc. of copy of Holy Quran ), 295-C ( Use of derogatory remarks etc. in respect of the Holy Prophet) , 298-A (Use of derogatory remarks, etc. in respect of holy personages ), 298-B (Misuse of epithet, descriptions and titles, etc. reserved for certain holy personages or places), and 298 –C (Person of Qadiani group, etc, calling himself a Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith). While sections 295-B, 295-C and 298-A are of general applicability, sections 298-B, 298-C are specifically applicable to Ahmadis/Lahoris. Anybody accused of having committed any of the offences dealt with in the above sections can be arrested without warrant and held without bail. Blaspheming the Prophet carries an obligatory death sentence. The vast sweep of the offences makes accusation quite easy and defending against accusation extremely difficult. Section 298-C for example prescribes that “ Any person of the Qadiani ….. who directly or indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, …… or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims….…shall be punished...”

The Islamic fervour is shared by many judges and is reflected in their judgments. In 2000, a judge of the Lahore High Court is reported to have publicly stated that anyone accused of blasphemy should be killed on the spot by Muslims as a religious obligation and that there was no need for any legal proceedings in such cases.(The statement was later reportedly retracted)

THE SUPRA LEGAL ZEALOTS

The situation is compounded by the courts and defence lawyers being threatened by Muslim zealots. In fact a High Court Judge who courageously acquitted two Christians accused of blasphemy ended up being assassinated. For those accused of blasphemy, acquittal by court is not the end of the story. Mullahs are quick to issue fatwas enjoining the killing of alleged blasphemers even after their acquittal by courts. And to cap it all the state refuses to interfere. According to The Daily Times (27 May 2007) --..

“ …..The man who scared everyone off the Sangla Hill crime is Lahore’s most powerful cleric and the government literally whimpers obsequiously when confronting him. In Karachi, the judge who threw a number of Shia in jail for possessing a classical account of their imams, could have been beaten up by the clergy waiting outside if he had let them go. Blasphemy is no vent for private grievances; it is a crime of a religious state that no ruler has the guts to eliminate…”
CAN DEMOCRACY BE THE SOLUTION
While the military is rightly blamed for being largely responsible for the present situation it does not appear that restoration of democracy will bring secularism or at least arrest the trend towards Talibanization. Leaving aside the chaotic period 1949-58 during which the bureaucrats ruled the country under a democratic façade, Pakistan has had a few spells of democracy--- normal democracy under ZA Bhutto (1972-77): and limited democracy (with military oversight) under Benazir Bhutto (1988-90) and (1993-96) and Nawaz Sharief (1990-93) and (1997-99). None of these democratically elected leaders could be accused of having promoted secularism or done anything to check the propagation of hate. During the ZA Bhutto watch the Ahmadis were legally declared non-Muslims: Benazir Bhutto presided over the creation of the Taliban: and Nawaz Sharief (in addition to having the Supreme Court stormed by his goons) almost succeeded with his 15th Amendment of the Constitution seeking to make the Holy Quran and Sunnah the supreme law of the land and directing the government to enforce amr bil ma’roof wa nahi anil munkar (prescribing what is right and forbidding what is wrong).

NO MORE THE LUNATIC FRINGE

Two unmistakable and constant features of Pakistan’s polity have been---(a) the vigorous hold of Islam on the masses and (b) the resort to Islam by Pakistan’s rulers to mobilize support for their purposes. Having been constantly fed the Islamic diet from the press, platform, pulpit and schools (government run or the deeni kind), the desire for Talibanization of the Muslim society has come to be shared by increasing sections of the Pakistani Muslims. Again to quote the Daily Times (02 June 2007)
…. “There is a lot of confusion in Pakistan over understanding the nature of violence in the country. What the Taliban want in the Tribal Areas is articulated in the mosques of the big cities in the settled areas. At any given time in Lahore, for instance, you will hear demands for the setting up of precisely the kind of governance demanded by the Taliban and implemented in the tribal areas. Most of us think that this kind of worldview in Lahore comes from fringe elements, but on close examination more and more people are embracing this discourse as their key to replacing the present “America-enslaved” system.”

Obviously it will require much more than the replacement of Musharraf with a civilian politician at the head of Pakistan government to pull the country back from the brink of the abyss.