THE DIVIDE IN KASHMIR

- Borders are relevant till the reasons to violate them disappear
Kanwal Sibal

The current turmoil in Jammu and Kashmir began with the blatantly communal reaction in the valley to the decision to transfer a mere 40 hectares of land to the Amarnath Shrine Board for creating temporary structures for the convenience of the pilgrims. That the valley Muslims could at all believe that this decision could have the potential, even remotely, to change the demographics of Jammu and Kashmir, is astonishing. For 60 years the government of India has meticulously observed its constitutional obligations to not disturb the demography of Jammu and Kashmir by permitting Indians from the rest of the country to purchase property and settle down permanently in the state. That separatist propaganda can so easily negate this record of good faith shows how futile it is to continue making core concessions to win the hearts and minds of the valley Kashmiris.
China, in Tibet next door, has changed the territory’s demography by settling Hans there in large numbers, reducing the Tibetans to a minority in Lhasa. It is ruthlessly exploiting Tibet’s natural resources, ignoring environmental norms. China has interfered with the practice of Lamaist Buddhism, destroying numerous monasteries during the Cultural Revolution in a bid to “modernize” Tibet. Its policies are guided essentially by security considerations, to establish an iron grip on the territory and neutralize any challenge to its authority there.
India’s policies have been incomparably more humane than China’s. India could have steadily changed the state’s demography, early after Independence, by settling there the Sikh population displaced from Pakistan. After 1965 and 1971, India could have taken hardheaded security-related decisions to ward off future dangers. India took no decisions with demographic implications even with Pakistan openly abetting terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir post-1990 and introducing a new level of challenge to the Indian State. The reverse demographic change brought about by the eviction of the Kashmiri Pandits from the valley has still not been undone.
The land in question at unlivable heights belongs to the Jammu and Kashmir state, not to any single religious community. Those “nationalist” Kashmiri leaders, who argue that their opposition is not “communal” as they oppose not the yatra but the transfer of land, are being specious. How can they oppose the yatra? Even the Chinese government allows the Mansarovar yatra, and that too in Tibet, the source of territorial tensions between India and China. Why does the valley oppose the land transfer? Because the decision is not that of a legitimate government? Because displacement of already settled people will take place? Because no precedent exists for any transfer of “forest” land for a public purpose? Because the reason for transfer is not good enough as more facilities for the pilgrims are not necessary? Or do the valley inhabitants consider that the land itself is “Muslim” and its use for offering better facilities to Hindus from outside is simply not palatable? Don’t the Hindus of Jammu and Kashmir have a say in the matter as citizens of the state?
Many ascribe the alienation of the Kashmiris to India’s shortchanging them regarding democracy by rigging elections. But any “rigging” affects the entire state, not a particular community. Why should one community feel specially aggrieved? Have the people of Jammu or Ladakh been alienated because Indian democracy has let them down? Once again, the real reasons are being obfuscated in order to find an exculpation for the militancy of the Muslim community. Separatist feelings in the valley existed long before any disenchantment with Indian democracy set in. Militancy was inspired by the rise of religious extremism in the region following the success of the Taliban. Sheikh Abdullah was not a paragon of democratic conduct. Those who practise mosque-based politics are not democrats. The insistence on Article 370 was motivated to a degree by a desire to rule Jammu and Kashmir as a fiefdom, outside the influence of India’s more egalitarian constitutional democracy. During the current turmoil, the street mobilization of people through the network of mosques is not democracy in action. Is Geelani’s Islamic ranting compatible with democracy? Mirwaiz is by no means a secular democratic leader. The demand for self-determination should not be conflated with democracy. After all Pakistan, whose own democratic credentials are questionable, has been in the forefront in asking for self-determination in Jammu and Kashmir — but not in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Self-determination is a political tool for the separatist agenda. If the Muslims were not in majority in the valley would they ask for self- determination?
The Indian government, faced with the extremely difficult challenge of controlling a state with separatist leanings buttressed by powerful foreign forces, may not have always acted according to the democratic rule-book. But in so many other ways it has shown remarkable sensitivity to Kashmiri aspirations, and so a total view should be taken. The problem in essence is the capacity of the valley Muslims, with their overwhelming local majority, to pursue a self-centred agenda, unmindful of the larger interests of Jammu and Kashmir, its Hindu and Buddhist population, or of the nation as a whole. If the population of the valley were Hindus and not Muslims, would shortchanging them of democracy have led to secessionism? Would reconciliation have eluded both sides for 60 years? Why is a compromise not possible?
The powerful agitation in Jammu against the decision to rescind the land transfer and the temporary dislocation of movement of goods to and from the valley has incited full-blown secessionism there. Propaganda about the so-called economic blockade of the valley was unleashed to provoke a separatist surge. The aim of the secessionists was to go on the offensive by creating an emotive issue and deflecting attention away from their own initial guilt. The valley Muslims have long disowned any responsibility for the exodus of the Pandits. The government of India’s inability to redress the situation has in all likelihood contributed to the lack of regard in the valley for the religious sentiments of the Jammu Hindus on the land transfer issue. The moment there was some show of strength in Jammu, the valley Muslims have retaliated with a seditious campaign of massive proportions, knowing killings in police firing will reinforce the sense of victimhood of the community, besides drawing international attention to their cause.
India’s internal peace and security and its international reputation have suffered at the hands of the Kashmiri secessionists for decades. Their challenge to the Indian State and popular sentiment continues unabated. The government’s task is no doubt inordinately difficult. But laws must be enforced, otherwise democracy, already a ‘soft’ system of governance, can slip into non-governance. Why are we giving a free run to the secessionists? Their pro-Pakistan demand for opening the Muzaffarabad road mocks at our sovereignty. It is a logical extension of policies to encourage cross-contacts over the line of control without first firmly controlling the political situation on the ground on our side. Why nurture the notion of a united Kashmir? Why help the Kashmiris create a common platform with Pakistanis in PoK? Will this make the Kashmiris as a whole more loyal to India? Borders remain relevant until the reason to violate them disappears.

The writer is former foreign secretary of India
THIS ARTICLE WAS WRITTEN A WEEK BEFORE THE AMARNATH AGREEMENT